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Item 95 (v) of the preliminary list*
General and complete disarmament

Conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels

Report of the Secretary General

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I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 66/37 of 2 December 2011 on conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels, the General Assembly decided to give urgent consideration to the issues involved in conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels, and requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the subject and to submit a report to the Assembly at its sixty-seventh session.

2. Pursuant to that request, on 9 March 2012, the Secretariat sent a note verbale to Member States requesting their views on the subject. As of the writing of the present report, eight replies have been received from the following States: Armenia, Burkina Faso, Colombia, Germany, Panama, Spain, Turkey and Turkmenistan. Those replies are reproduced in section II below. Subsequent replies will be issued as addenda.

II. Replies received from Member States

Armenia

[Original: English]
[12 June 2012]

General Assembly resolution 66/37 is an important opportunity to examine the challenges related to conventional arms control at the regional and subregional levels, to identify the sources of discord and to seek lasting solutions.

Armenia has always been a staunch advocate for regional cooperation in every possible sphere, including the sphere of conventional arms control, which plays a significant role in promoting confidence-building and contributing to regional security.

Guided by this principled approach, Armenia contributes to conventional arms control within the framework of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Partnership for Peace/Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, making every effort to further strengthen the conventional arms control regime in the European area in general and the region of the South Caucasus in particular.

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is one of the pillars of security and stability in Europe. Its implementation has promoted an unprecedented and wide-scale disarmament process in Europe and the growth of transparency in the conventional arms control sphere. The Treaty has played a vital role as a stabilizing factor during the transition period in the European security environment.

Armenia is committed to the strict implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. The Armenian side, remaining committed to its treaty obligations, exchanges information on the armed forces of Armenia, their structure, areas of deployment and Treaty-limited equipment, and receives inspections. The reports of the latter clearly state that Armenia is fully implementing the Treaty.

Armenia is actively participating in the negotiations to strengthen and modernize the conventional arms control regime in Europe. The principled position of the Armenian side is that the new legally binding document must be of an "all-weather" nature and its implementation not subject to any condition.

Violations of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe by Azerbaijan

The Treaty's fundamental role and significance has grown, especially in the South Caucasus region where, unfortunately, Azerbaijan has unleashed a decidedly dangerous race of armaments.

According to official information on implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, as of 1 January 2012, Azerbaijan significantly exceeded its established ceilings in three categories of Treaty-limited equipment. The Azerbaijani holdings in battle tanks were 381 (permitted ceiling is 220) and in artillery are 516 (permitted ceiling is 285). In 2011 there was a sizeable increase of holdings in artillery (47) as well as in the categories of attack helicopters (3 to 5) and armoured combat vehicles (106). Unfortunately Azerbaijan failed to reflect the exceeding of its ceiling of armoured combat vehicles — 287 against 220 — permitted by the Treaty.

The manifold increase of Azerbaijan's military budget over the last years (the defence budget for 2012 is $3.47 billion) and the persistent aggressive and harsh anti-Armenian rhetoric of the Azerbaijani leadership also increase the gap between the two nations, heighten the tension in the region of the South Caucasus and seriously undermine the negotiation process aimed at the peaceful settlement of existing problems, particularly the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. The negligent position of Azerbaijan in this regard has a very negative impact on the efforts of Armenia to promote an atmosphere of trust and cooperation in the region.

Confidence- and security-building measures of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

The main tools for the Republic of Armenia in the field of conventional arms control are the OSCE confidence- and security-building measures: the Vienna Document 1999, the Global Exchange of Military Information database, the Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, the questionnaire on anti-personnel landmines, etc. Armenia considers the OSCE confidence- and security-building measures as part of its own security structure and an important means of reducing actual and perceived threats to its own and broader regional security.

Armenia actively participates in the implementation of the Vienna Document provisions and the other mentioned confidence- and security-building measures in the conventional arms sphere. The Armenian side largely contributed to the updating of the Vienna Document by supporting most of the suggestions on its modernization, some of which were adopted as Forum for Security Cooperation decisions and later incorporated into the Vienna Document 2011. Armenia advocates further modernization of the Vienna Document for preserving and strengthening security and stability in the European region, especially in the light of existing difficulties with the modernization of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Burkina Faso

[Original: French]
[4 June 2012]

At the subregional level

Inter-State conflicts have practically disappeared from our subregion since the early 1990s. However, we have witnessed a resurgence of internal conflicts and tensions, such as the Tuareg rebellions in Niger and in Mali. Unfortunately, wrongful use and illicit trafficking[1] of weapons has remained widespread in Mali since its partition into two zones at the beginning of 2012.[2]

The crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, which began on 19 September 2002, has had a lasting negative impact on the subregion. Weapons of all calibres have been used by belligerents on each side without any effective control. We cannot remain silent regarding the crisis in Casamance, Senegal, which has continued since the 1980s. There have also been internal social and political crises in Togo. The common denominator in all of these conflicts is the often disproportionate use of weapons that are difficult to trace. This leads us to conclude that small arms and light weapons, and often heavy weapons, have been misused at the subregional level.

Given the multiplicity of crises in the subregion and the porous borders, arms used in one country easily find their way into neighbouring countries.

At the national level

In view of Burkina Faso's geographical location, sharing six borders with its neighbours, and the porous nature of those borders, the country cannot be said to exercise any significant control over the circulation of conventional arms. Indeed, we do not have sufficient resources for effective border control.

Another difficult area is inventory management of weapons and ammunitions stocks (owing to physical conditions, including heat and humidity) belonging to the Defence and Security Forces. These arms are not stored very securely, and the same is often true for those of licensed weapons traders.

With respect to the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons of 10 October 1980, signed in Geneva, Burkina Faso ratified it on 26 November 2003. It is therefore an integral part of our domestic legal system. We note that our Defence and Security Forces have never ordered or used these types of weapons. Furthermore, these weapons are not considered in the military strategies of our Defence and Security Forces.

In conclusion, conventional weapons, in particular small arms and light weapons, continue to be used, with their attendant share of daily misfortunes, across the subregion and in our country primarily in armed attacks by highway bandits, and

[1] In *Jeune Afrique*, No. 2650 (29 October 2011), former President of Mali Amadou Toumani Touré commented on the proliferation of arms in the Sahel. He observed that Libya was a weapons depot and a powder keg and that the Arab Spring had shaken an already fragile region. From his viewpoint, it was more like an extremely harsh winter.

[2] The north of the country has been occupied by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad and by terrorist or extremist groups such as the Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Dine and others.

in burglaries of homes and other private premises. Burkina Faso therefore supports the addition of small arms and light weapons and their ammunitions as an eighth category in the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, according to the "7+1+1" formula for the draft arms trade treaty (ATT).

Colombia

[Original: Spanish]
[12 June 2012]

In Colombia, the State has a monopoly on arms. Under the current regulations, Industria Militar de Colombia is the entity responsible for their production, import and marketing. In addition, in exceptional cases where authorized individuals carry weapons, those persons are under the jurisdiction of the Department for the Control of the Arms, Ammunition and Explosives Trade, Armed Forces General Command.

As Colombia produces and sells the weapons that the Armed Forces need to fulfil their constitutional mission, there is no surplus, overproduction or export of large quantities of weapons.

Obsolete and outdated arms that cannot be converted by the Armed Forces are destroyed.

Strict controls are in place for the arsenals of the Armed Forces and for seized and confiscated equipment in order to prevent illegal diversion. Information on that equipment is entered into the SAP-SR3 system and into the integrated logistics information system, which is used to control inventory, movements, intended use and redeployment.

For control purposes, seized and confiscated equipment is entered in the inventories of the warehouses of military and police units.

It is essential that States, and particularly the producers of arms and ammunition, agree to revise their production and marking processes for effective traceability in order to trace any diversion to groups outside the law; clearly identify suppliers; and compile a regional and subregional register.

The defence sector therefore seeks to implement mechanisms for effective control of arms production and sales in Colombia in order to prevent State-owned weapons and confiscated items from entering illegal arms trafficking networks, which also affects other States.

Germany

[Original: English]
[17 April 2012]

Germany is dedicated to confidence-building and conventional arms control measures at the regional level. Germany attaches great importance and devotes considerable commitment to OSCE as its relevant regional security organization. Detailed information about Germany's commitment regarding regional security and confidence-building can be found in the report it submitted to the Secretary-General on 14 April 2011 in accordance with General Assembly resolution 63/57 on

confidence-building measures in the field of conventional arms. Moreover, Germany transmitted its views to the Secretary-General on 15 July 2011 with respect to General Assembly resolution 65/47 on confidence-building measures in the regional and subregional context (see A/66/112/Add.1).

With regard to the request formulated in paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 66/37, currently Germany does not consider the Conference on Disarmament to be the appropriate forum for the formulation of principles regarding regional agreements on conventional arms control. We note that non-universal membership of the Conference on Disarmament may prevent specific regional contexts from being adequately taken into account when formulating such principles.

Germany would like to add that it would consider it natural that States having initiated or sponsored a resolution in which the General Assembly asks the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States would report accordingly in a timely and comprehensive manner to the Secretary-General.

Panama

[Original: Spanish]
[7 May 2012]

The Ministry of Public Security reports that by Constitutional mandate the Republic of Panama does not have a standing army and therefore does not have this type of weapon. The Ministry takes this opportunity to urge all States members of the same region or subregion that possess conventional armed forces to support and comply with the international agreements governing the control of such weapons in order to promote peace and security in their respective regions and subregions. The Ministry further considers it essential to preserve and renew all conventional arms control instruments. States should act responsibly and transparently to reduce insecurity, especially in areas where there either has been or could be a conflict.

Spain

[Original: Spanish]
[3 May 2012]

The ultimate goal of any system of arms control or confidence- and security-building measures should be to prevent conflict by reducing the dangers of misunderstanding or miscalculation of military activities of other countries; taking steps to impede covert military preparations; reducing the risk of surprise attacks and reducing the risk of the outbreak of war by accident.

The measures agreed upon may be legally or politically binding, but in any case should meet a series of requirements that can be summed up in the following principles:

- *Specificity*. Measures should be specifically negotiated for each case and each geographical area
- *Transparency*. This should be based on exchanges of information and the establishment of regular contacts and free-flowing communication

- *Verifiability*. The measures adopted should include a system for verifying their implementation. This is the only way to maintain confidence in cases of suspected non-compliance

- *Reciprocity*. Each party's gains in terms of a higher level of confidence in the other parties should be matched by similar gains in the other parties' levels of confidence. Otherwise, measures of this type will be much harder to negotiate

- *Voluntary nature of negotiations and mandatory nature of compliance*. The parties should feel comfortable with the measures agreed at each stage of the process. In addition, the political will required for the negotiation of measures of this type should be commensurate with the mandatory nature of compliance with these measures

- *Progressivity*. The measures should be seen as a process in which new and more effective measures are progressively developed as confidence between the parties improves

- *Complementarity*. Care should be taken at all times to ensure complementarity between the measures adopted at the global (United Nations), regional, subregional and bilateral levels and to avoid the duplication of measures.

Moreover, an arms control regime, in order to be effective, requires:

– A consultative body to monitor the measures' implementation. All the parties should be represented in such a body, which should provide for the reporting of any problems encountered in the practical application of the measures, as well as for the negotiation of new measures or the modification of existing ones. This body should be able to exert enough political pressure to convince the parties of the need for full compliance with the commitments undertaken (the involvement of the most powerful countries in each region is therefore extremely important).

– A suitable system of communications that enables the parties to meet the response deadlines laid down in the various measures and that is flexible enough to ensure the flow of information needed to restore confidence in the event of any disturbances.

The establishment of confidence-building measures, especially among affected neighbouring States, the strengthening of border controls and the training of specialized staff, among other arrangements, could create a propitious environment for the elaboration of supranational (including subregional) arms control agreements.

In addition, regional and subregional conventional arms control agreements should take into account the importance of:

(a) Establishing new confidence-building measures among neighbouring countries and strengthening those currently in place;

(b) Increasing transparency measures within the regional and subregional forums themselves;

(c) Disseminating the objectives of such forums to countries in the area that have not yet endorsed them;

(d) Compiling an arms inventory in the countries where such inventories do not yet exist;

(e) Strengthening measures to promote universal adherence to the various international instruments;

(f) Enforcing strict requirements of export and import permits;

(g) Strengthening mechanisms for monitoring weapons manufacturers and, in cases where the weapons purchased are not end products, suppliers and component assemblers.

Turkey

[Original: English]
[7 May 2012]

Regional and subregional arms control arrangements are complex constructs to establish and maintain. They require deeper politico-military analysis, more detailed undertakings and a higher degree of implementation in comparison to the arms control arrangements at universal or continental level. However, they should be an integral part of any conventional arms control architecture if the problems of military stability and security at regional and subregional levels are to be addressed in a meaningful way.

The Flank Agreement of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe regime is a successful example in this regard. This agreement serves as the main provider of conventional security at regional and subregional levels in Europe, in particular in the Caucasus, the Black Sea region and northern Europe.

Turkmenistan

[Original: Russian]
[27 April 2012]

Turkmenistan, as an independent and permanently neutral country, is actively committed to the implementation of the conventions, agreements and treaties which are of fundamental importance in upholding the international security system, and also in promoting peace and stability in society, and it recognizes the primacy of the universally accepted rules of international law. Turkmenistan fully supports the initiative by the United Nations to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other modern weapons of mass destruction in Central Asia and strictly abides by all its international commitments and the conventions which it has signed on the prohibition of these weapons.

The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia was opened in Ashgabat on 10 December 2007. Independent and permanently neutral Turkmenistan fully supports the initiative by the United Nations to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other modern weapons of mass destruction in Central Asia and strictly abides by all its international commitments and the conventions which it has signed on the prohibition of these weapons. The military doctrine of independent and permanently neutral Turkmenistan underscores that the ability to deploy weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and the dissemination of new military production technologies constitute the principal threats to military security.

As stated in article 6 of the Constitution of Turkmenistan, adopted on 26 September 2008, "Turkmenistan, as a fully fledged member of the international community, maintains a foreign policy based on the principles of permanent positive neutrality, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, renunciation of the use of force and of participation in military blocs and alliances and the promotion of peaceful, friendly and mutually beneficial relations with the countries of the region and other States around the world. Turkmenistan abides by the universally recognized rules of international law. If in an international treaty to which Turkmenistan is a party rules are defined which are at variance with the law of Turkmenistan, the rules of the international treaty shall prevail."

As a member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Turkmenistan, along with all the other States members of this organization, submits an annual report on its armed forces in accordance with the current programme of the Helsinki Document of 1992, in compliance with the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, the global exchange of military information and the annual exchange of military information. For the purpose of arms control, and also in compliance with the above instruments on the annual submission of military information and the provisions of the Vienna Document 1999 of the OSCE negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures, Turkmenistan is visited every year by military inspection teams comprising inspectors from other countries.

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General and complete disarmament

Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control

Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/67/50.

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I. Introduction

1. On 2 December 2011, the General Assembly adopted resolution 66/31, entitled "Observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control". In paragraph 4 of the resolution, the General Assembly invited all Member States to communicate to the Secretary-General information on the measures they have adopted to promote the objectives envisaged in the resolution and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report containing that information to the Assembly at its sixty-seventh session.

2. Pursuant to that request, on 16 February 2012, a note verbale was sent to Member States inviting them to provide information on the subject. The replies received are contained in section II below. Additional replies received will be issued as addenda to the present report.

II. Replies received from Governments

Colombia

[Original: Spanish]
[31 May 2012]

Colombia remains fully committed to the observance of all international standards in environmental conservation within the framework of agreements on disarmament and non-proliferation. Accordingly, in international and regional forums, as in the bilateral sphere, when such agreements are mooted or discussed, it will maintain the goal of ensuring the preservation of the environment.

Colombia is a country that ensures compliance with the related domestic norms and international commitments.

We may therefore state, following consultations in the relevant areas, that Colombia will continue to support the goals set out under General Assembly resolution 66/31.

Cuba

[Original: Spanish]
[27 March 2012]

Cuba reaffirms the importance of the strict observance of environmental norms in the drafting and implementation of agreements on disarmament and arms control and shares the position adopted by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that, in international disarmament forums, full account should be taken of the relevant environmental norms in the negotiation of international treaties and agreements on disarmament and arms control.

Cuba ensures strict compliance with these norms in all aspects of social life, including in the implementation of related international instruments to which it is a party, such as, in particular: the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Cuba has vast experience in adopting and implementing laws and policies that enable it to observe environmental norms. It has a solid legal foundation for the protection of the environment:

- Article 27 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cuba incorporates the concept of sustainable development.

- Act No. 81/1997 on the environment lays down the principles that underpin Cuba's environmental policy, stating, inter alia: "Managing the environment is a comprehensive and cross-cutting endeavour; it involves the coordinated participation of State bodies, other entities and institutions, society and the citizenry as a whole, each in keeping with its respective mandates and abilities".

- Decree-Law No. 207 entitled "On the use of nuclear energy" establishes the general rules for such activities.

- Decree No. 208 entitled "On the national accountability and control system for nuclear materials" establishes the regulations for the operation of the system with the aim of promoting efficient management of such materials and detecting their unauthorized use, loss or movement.

- The legal regime governing biosecurity and the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention is reflected in: Decree-Law No. 199/90, entitled "On biological security", resolution No. 2/2004 of the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment (CITMA), entitled "Regulation on accountability and control of biological materials, equipment and related technology", the most recent update of the "List of biological agents that affect humans, animals and plants" and the "Regulation granting authorizations in the field of biological security". The latter two are contained in CITMA resolutions Nos. 38/2006 and 18/2007.

- Decree-Law No. 202/1999 regulates implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention at the national level.

- Agreement 5517 of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers of 2005, entitled "On contraventions resulting from violation of the rules of the Chemical Weapons Convention", rounded out the legislative measures needed to implement the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Of the nearly 23,000 nuclear weapons currently existing in the world, each incomparably more powerful than those that cast a pall over the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it would take no more than about a hundred to usher in a nuclear winter that would in a short space of time cause the death of all human beings and destroy the earth's environment.

The mere existence of such weapons and their ongoing development are among the most serious threats to international peace and security and to the fragile environmental balance of the planet, already endangered by the disastrous effects of climate change.

The only effective solution that can prevent the dire consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction remains the total elimination of such weapons.

It is important to highlight the relevance and importance of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, ratified by Cuba on 10 April 1978, which remains fully in force and should be universally accepted.

Iraq

[Original: Arabic]
[31 May 2012]

Iraq is well aware of the importance of problems related to pollution of the environment and, in particular, that caused by military operations and the weapons used in such operations. The effect of those operations was manifest in Iraq after the first and second Gulf wars and the events of 2003, all of which had a huge environmental impact, caused by the destruction of military institutions and installations related to armament programmes. In order to eliminate that pollution and its deleterious impact on human beings and the environment, huge material and large numbers of human resources are required.

The Government of Iraq has taken many measures to curb the effects of that pollution, including the following:

First: National environment-related legislation:

1. The Iraqi Constitution, article 9, paragraph 5, provides that the Iraqi Government shall respect and implement Iraq's international obligations regarding the non-proliferation, non-development, non-production, and non-use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and shall prohibit associated equipment, materiel, technologies, and delivery systems for use in the development, manufacture, production, and use of such weapons. Iraq remains committed to its undertakings and continues to cooperate with the relevant international institutions and organizations with a view to limiting the impact of environmental pollution in general and that resulting from former armament programmes.

2. The Iraqi Penal Code, Law No. 111 of 1969, provides general protection and respect for the human environment in articles 479, 488, 491, 497 and 499, all of which provide protection for aspects of the environment.

3. The Ministry of the Environment Law, No. 38 of 2008.

4. The Law on the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate for the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Second: International instruments which Iraq has ratified, some of the most important of which include the following:

1. Pursuant to Law No. 42 of 2007, Iraq ratified the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, which was signed on 22 March 1985 in Vienna, and the 2007 Montreal Adjustment.

2. The 2008 Law on ratification of the revised International Health Regulations which were agreed by the twenty-eighth session of the World Health Assembly in 2005.

3. The 2008 Law concerning the accession of the Republic of Iraq to the Convention on Biological Diversity which was signed in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992.

4. In view of the importance of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Iraq ratified that Convention and its ratification entered into force on 31 July 2011.

The most important institutions in the field of the environment and disarmament include the following:

1. The increasing importance of the environment and ever-increasing problems of pollution have been given due consideration by the Government of Iraq, which promulgated Law No. 38 of 2008, pursuant to which the Ministry of the Environment was established. The Ministry has issued a set of instructions, arrangements and measures aimed at curbing the negative impact of pollution or reducing it to internationally acceptable levels, in accordance with national legislation and international standards.

2. The Ministry of Science and Technology is taking continuous action to clean up polluting installations and facilities and has numerous plans and projects to prevent all types of pollution and introduce means and treatments appropriate to the nature of the pollution.

3. Iraq has accorded high priority to complying with international non-proliferation standards, and has established the Iraqi National Monitoring Directorate for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. It is also concerned with controlling dual-use materials that enter the country and ensuring that Iraqi territory is not used for related purposes.

4. The Iraqi Radioactive Sources Regulatory Authority controls such sources in order to ensure their safe usage.

While Iraq does not currently possess any weapons that have an impact on the environment, it renews its commitment to all the international instruments relating to disarmament and non-proliferation and others relating to mankind and the environment.

Lebanon

[Original: Arabic]
[18 April 2012]

Lebanon possesses no weapons that have an impact on or are detrimental to the environment and supports the agreements on disarmament, arms control and the observance of environmental norms. It is, however, deeply concerned by Israel's possession and maintenance of a huge arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, which could be very harmful to the environment, even if they are not used.

Qatar

[Original: English]
[16 April 2012]

In implementing disarmament agreements, the State of Qatar ensures the achievement of scientific and technological progress without damaging the environment, by adopting the following measures:

1. The Government of the State of Qatar created the National Committee for Arms Control, which includes a representative from the Ministry of Environment, was established in accordance with Ministerial decree 26/2004.

2. The Government of the State of Qatar enacted environmental Law 21/2002, which defines the pollutants that are not allowed to be exceeded in the natural ingredients of the environment (water, air and soil).

3. The Government of the State of Qatar enacted Law 31/2002 on protection against radiation and the development of standards and requirements of prevention.

4. The Government of the State of Qatar established monitoring stations for early detection of radiation.

5. The Government of the State of Qatar enacted Law 17/2007 on chemical weapons.

6. The Government of the State of Qatar subjected the handling of chemicals and biological materials to environmental standards.

7. The issuance of licences to facilities requires the agreement of several administrations, especially the Ministry of Environment.

8. The Government of the State of Qatar created the Division of Environmental Security within the armed forces.

Syrian Arab Republic

[Original: Arabic]
[29 May 2012]

1. The munitions on hand in the Ordnance Directorate have no impact on the environment. They consist of normal, traditional ammunition for light arms, artillery and tanks.

2. Expired (out-of-date) or outdated munitions are either dismantled or detonated.

3. Dismantling is carried out in secure, fortified buildings prepared for that purpose, account being taken of all recommended environmental measures.

4. Detonation, which is used for munitions that cannot be destroyed by dismantling, is carried out in open pits in uninhabited, non-agricultural areas of open desert far from grazing lands and nature preserves and does not affect natural and underground water sources. Such areas, which are protected and closed to persons not employed in them, are selected in coordination with the relevant ministries and public institutions, including the Ministry of Irrigation, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment.

5. In this method of destruction, care is taken to ensure that the explosion results in the smallest possible quantity of residue. All the residue resulting from the detonation operation is collected and buried in deep pits.

Turkey

[Original: English]
[30 May 2012]

Measures adopted by Turkey in order to ensure disarmament without detrimental effects to nature and human health and compliance with environmental norms are as follows:

- The Turkish Armed Forces endures the compatibility of military activities with environmental legislation. Military activities are subject to the Turkish Armed Forces Directive on Environmental Control (MY 433-5). The output and disposal process of any military equipment and waste is subject to the Waste Control Directive (MSY 433-2).

- Surplus arms are disposed in accordance with the environmental norms at the Turkish Armed Forces Plant for Ammunition Disposal and Sorting, built to NATO standards.

- Turkey complies with the relevant international documents such as the Ottawa Convention as well as United Nations and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe documents on small arms and light weapons, while destroying and disposing of surplus military equipment and ammunition. The surplus equipment and ammunition are dismantled without detriment to the environment, the explosive parts being separated, while TNT and metal scraps are recycled and remanufactured.

- The process of burning and destruction of explosive material is carried out in closed systems, thereby ensuring that dangerous combustion gases are filtered and toxic waste and gases are prevented from spreading to the environment.

- Following the separation process, TNT or class B explosives are melted in closed systems to a certain level of purity and reused. Through this process hazardous substances are recycled without any harm to the environment or human health.

- Metal wastes are pressed in hydraulic presses and precious metals, such as copper and aluminium with a high economic value, are sorted and recycled or remanufactured as a contribution to the national economy.

The destruction process of the stocked anti-personnel landmines was completed in November 2010 at the Turkish Armed Forces Plant for Ammunition Disposal and Sorting, while the anti-personnel landmines containing depleted uranium were destroyed in Germany in August 2011.

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Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation

Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/67/50.

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I. Introduction

1. On 2 December 2011, the General Assembly adopted resolution 66/32, entitled "Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation". In paragraph 8 of the resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to seek the views of Member States on the issue of the promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and to submit a report thereon to the Assembly at its sixty-seventh session.

2. Pursuant to that request, on 13 February 2012, a note verbale was sent to Member States inviting them to provide information on the subject. The replies received are reproduced in section II below. Additional replies received will be issued as addenda to the present report.

II. Replies received from Governments

Cuba

[Original: Spanish]
[5 June 2012]

The complex international situation and the need for a collective response to the pressing problems besetting humanity confirm the importance of multilateralism as the most viable option for addressing the new threats in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation. It confirms the relevance of the United Nations General Assembly resolution on this topic.

The disarmament and arms control agreements, negotiated and implemented in a truly multilateral, effective and non-discriminatory framework, provide an appropriate mechanism for States parties to consult one another and work together to solve any problem that may arise with regard to their objectives or the implementation of the provisions of those agreements.

The stalemate stemming from the lack of political will on the part of certain actors that has persisted for several years in the negotiations on the multilateral disarmament machinery increase the value of multilateralism.

The unilateral actions in the area of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control undertaken by some countries to promote the negotiation of multilateral international instruments outside the framework of the United Nations are a cause for concern, as they erode confidence in the international system, the foundations of the United Nations itself and the credibility of multilateral agreements on disarmament.

Only by seeking negotiated solutions in a multilateral framework, and acknowledging the need to arrive at collective agreements, can international peace and security be safeguarded.

The goals of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction cannot be achieved through unilateral measures, the development of strategic alliances to promote agreements negotiated outside internationally recognized multilateral frameworks, or by the use or threat of use of force. Multilateralism and peaceful solutions negotiated through the organs established for

such purposes and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations are the appropriate channels.

The General Assembly of the United Nations, as the Organization's most representative and democratic body, must play the central role in efforts to strengthen the multilateral route. Cuba reaffirms its commitment to the promotion, preservation and strengthening of multilateralism and the multilateral decision-making process.

Norway

[Original: English]
[1 June 2012]

The Conference on Disarmament is proclaimed to be the sole multilateral negotiating body. Norway would question this idea. Any credible and relevant multilateral disarmament negotiating body should be open to all countries, and especially members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Currently, only 65 countries are members of the Conference on Disarmament. The Conference has virtually no interaction with civil society. As a principle, all stakeholders should be included in disarmament processes, including relevant non-governmental organizations. The working methods of the Conference are in dire need of reform. It is not acceptable that the consensus principle is applied in ways that allow countries to single-handedly bring work to a standstill. All these factors have led the Conference on Disarmament to its present dysfunctional state, where it has not been able to deliver anything of substance in a decade and a half and appears increasingly marginalized and irrelevant.

The United Nations Disarmament Commission, established for the purpose of conducting substantive deliberations and making recommendations, has not been able to deliver anything for over a decade. If the Disarmament Commission is to be preserved at all, it has to be made more practical, more focused and more relevant. We continue to believe that regular sessions of the Disarmament Commission should be much shorter and focus on one or two topics, decided on by the First Committee of the General Assembly.

We should also look at ways to improve the working methods of the First Committee, which should play a crucial role in advancing the work on disarmament and non-proliferation. This is all the more important as other parts of the machinery have come to a grinding halt. Norway has for years questioned whether the great efforts mobilized to secure the highest number of co-sponsors to resolutions is the best way to make use of our time and energy. If we could agree on limiting the practice of seeking co-sponsorship to only newly introduced resolutions, we would improve the efficiency of the First Committee. It is also Norway's view that an adopted resolution stands unless otherwise decided. Such an understanding could help bring the number of repetitive resolutions down, make more time available for substantive and focused discussions and make the First Committee more able to reflect new political opportunities to move the disarmament agenda forward.

Norway fully subscribes to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. There have long been calls for negotiations on a legally binding convention, in line with the provisions of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Norway acknowledges

the need — and obligation — to negotiate such an instrument, in good faith and in accordance with the advisory opinion issued by the International Court of Justice in 1996. However, Norway has questioned the call by many States for the negotiation of such an instrument to be conducted in the Conference on Disarmament. As an alternative, Norway would recommend looking at ways to utilize the General Assembly to ensure progress. This would indicate a clear alternative to the current status quo.

Panama

[Original: Spanish]
[23 May 2012]

In this context, we believe that, through the vehicle of multilateralism, States have the opportunity to work towards and make their contribution to addressing serious challenges of the present day, including, among others, international organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism and illicit trafficking in firearms.

Panama is a signatory to international instruments that encourage and promote multilateralism in the endeavour to achieve disarmament and the non-proliferation of firearms.

We recommend further work on the development of multilateral agreements that are truly effective and attain the established goals relating to disarmament and non-proliferation.

Qatar

[Original: English]
[11 April 2012]

The State of Qatar supports and encourages multilateralism in disarmament and non-proliferation, as it is among the factors that enhance the credibility of this principle, the sharing of responsibility and the seriousness of the intentional commitments in this regard.

Spain

[Original: Spanish]
[26 March 2012]

The twenty-first century has changed both the concept and the collective perception of international security. The confluence of new actors, challenges and threats that exacerbate the uncertainty and complexity of our times has placed security among the priorities of the international community.

The European Security Strategy identifies five major threats: the proliferation of weapons, especially those of mass destruction; terrorism; failed States; regional conflicts; and organized crime. It is needless to emphasize the effect of conventional arms and their role in feeding crises and violence.

The recently approved Spanish Security Strategy identifies the following threats and risks: armed conflicts; terrorism; organized crime; economic and financial insecurity; energy vulnerability; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; cyberthreats; uncontrolled migration flows; and emergencies and disasters. Among all these, where the present report is concerned, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction stands out as one of the greatest threats of our era, especially if rogue actors, such as terrorist organizations, succeed in obtaining and using them.

Spain's National Defence Directive No. 1/2008 states that the current strategic scenario is characterized by complexity, uncertainty and potential hazards. Terrorism, organized crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the most serious transnational threats facing our society.

According to National Defence Directive No. 1/2008, failed, weak or disintegrating States, as well as regional conflicts, give rise to serious crises that have repercussions in other States and maritime areas. The struggle for access to basic resources, together with the effects of climate change, are emerging as major sources of conflict in the years to come. In addition, cyberspace is a new dimension in the realm of security and defence.

These emerging realities require multilateral responses, political commitment and consultation if international peace and stability are to be enhanced substantively.

In a globalized and interdependent world, security is a value and aspiration of States, institutions, regions, communities and, above all, of citizens. Insecurity in our times originates not only from aggressor States, but also from non-State actors, terrorists and other criminal organizations. The deterioration of security hampers the development of peoples and nations, because violence denies the right of all people to progress; the advancement of human rights and democratic values is essential for the exercise of liberty.

One of the main problems connected with proliferation is the existence of multiple treaties, agreements, initiatives and control regimes, and the need to coordinate their implementation and criteria, not always an easy task. Although in principle these are all supported by like-minded countries, and the international community is increasingly espousing the goal of combating proliferation, the fact that not all States are included in all of them creates problems that are sometimes difficult to resolve. Nevertheless, advances and attitudinal changes have taken place that allow us some measure of optimism in that regard.

These reflections lead us to the questions of how to address these challenges, and the necessary and most effective ways of doing so. No doubt, what is needed is a multidisciplinary strategy that encompasses intergovernmental cooperation, the development of joint monitoring, verification and follow-up mechanisms, information exchange, and the establishment of new controls or the updating of earlier ones. Their scope involves national defence systems, the strengthening of multilateral instruments and organizations, cooperation in development, and the eradication of illicit trafficking, as well as other aspects.

We must provide effective solutions for combating international security risks. The most appropriate approach is political and diplomatic agreement, which must be reflected in legally binding conventions on disarmament and arms control.

Spain is committed to the multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament system; it has signed all the international agreements constituting the legal and normative framework of that system, and maintains an active, ambitious and consistent policy in support of its effectiveness and with the clear objective of achieving the universality of the major treaties in this area.

In order to ensure that a disarmament and non-proliferation system functions effectively, it must be truly multilateral in nature and based on full compliance by States with their obligations. This multilateral approach, in addition to increasing the system's effectiveness, gives it important legitimacy.

This is why, as part of its general action strategy, National Defence Directive No. 1/2008 states that defence policy shall rely, among other factors, on "Spain's commitment to defend international peace and security with regard to international legality and the exercise of multilateralism as a vehicle for concerted action in international relations and for conflict resolution".

In order to remain credible, the effectiveness of the international system needs to be improved. This will require more cohesive instruments, greater political commitment and more legally binding agreements. Regulations must require compliance with the obligations undertaken by States and foster the promotion of rigorous and transparent verification systems that are accepted by all States. The capacity for consensus also needs to be broadened so as to establish legal frameworks conducive to the effective advancement of peace, security, cooperation and global progress. In this regard, it is vital to agree on an agenda for the Conference on Disarmament with a view to reactivating this important multilateral forum on disarmament and non-proliferation.

As both a global and a European actor, Spain is firmly committed to the reforms of multilateralism, which necessitates a greater engagement in the renewal of our international relations and the mechanisms and institutions thereof.

A responsible non-proliferation and disarmament policy requires the promotion of an effective multilateral system. To that end it will be necessary:

- To seek comprehensive political solutions that prevent, deter or stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or conventional weapons;
- To integrate policy on non-proliferation and disarmament into general security policy;
- To consider the possibility of including non-proliferation clauses in bilateral and regional relations;
- To promote the universality, defence and strengthening of international treaties, conventions, agreements and regimes;
- To strengthen the role of the United Nations Security Council;
- To promote the national implementation of international obligations;
- To improve the effectiveness of verification mechanisms through political, economic and technical support;
- To strengthen import and export control systems relating to defence and dual-use materials;

To promote international information exchange;

To strengthen technical assistance among States and cooperation for development;

To promote legal and responsible trade in defence materials and dual-use technologies, and prevent illicit trafficking;

To facilitate collaboration among government agencies, non-governmental organizations and industries that share the same objective.

Only an effective multilateral system can successfully tackle the threat to international peace and security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in combination with other phenomena such as international terrorism, transnational organized crime, failed States and regional conflicts.

Turkmenistan

[Original: Russian]
[14 May 2012]

At its sixty-sixth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 66/32, entitled "Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and nonproliferation", which recalls General Assembly resolution 56/24 T of 29 November 2001 on multilateral cooperation in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation and global efforts against terrorism. The resolution was adopted on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations with the aim of maintaining international peace and security; taking effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to peace and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace; and ensuring by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law the arbitration or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to breaches of the peace.

Pursuant to this resolution the United Nations Disarmament Commission carries out necessary and useful work to develop confidence-building measures and ensure transparency in the area of conventional weapons, underscoring the importance of multilateralism in addressing these matters. The United Nations Disarmament Commission is one of the most appropriate platforms for international efforts to step up multilateral disarmament diplomacy, to strengthen existing international non-proliferation and arms control mechanisms, and to establish new such mechanisms. In 1998, the post of Special Coordinator on Transparency was created. Transparency in armaments helps strengthen mutual confidence, prevent destabilizing supplies of arms and create an atmosphere conducive to comprehensive disarmament.

By a resolution adopted on 12 December 1995, the General Assembly recognized the permanent neutral status of Turkmenistan. On that basis, the Constitutional Act on the Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan was issued on 27 December 1995. The permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan proclaimed by this Act is the foundation of its domestic and foreign policy, which is designed to strengthen stability and social harmony and to develop friendly and mutually beneficial relations with States in the region and around the world.

Turkmenistan is underpinned by its peace-loving foreign policy, which is a direct consequence of its neutral status and international commitments. Accordingly, all matters are addressed exclusively through political and diplomatic channels, primarily the United Nations and other authoritative international organizations. The foreign policy of Turkmenistan, which aims to develop ties with other States and international bodies and to resolve matters conducive to the establishment of a benign and forward-looking world order, has played a constructive role in ensuring regional peace and security, a priority issue for the international community.

Turkmenistan has ratified a number of international conventions and agreements for the implementation of its disarmament obligations: the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction; the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings; the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition; and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Turkmenistan is not involved in the manufacture of arms and no arms of any kind are transported through its State territory. Accordingly, Turkmenistan is fulfilling its disarmament and non-proliferation obligations, meeting its commitment to prevent threats to international peace and security, and supporting joint disarmament and non-proliferation efforts by the international community as a whole.

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United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report provides an overview of the activities of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean during the period from July 2011 to June 2012.

During the reporting period, the Regional Centre focused its activities on supporting States in combating the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, ammunition and explosives, which pose serious threats to public security in the region. The Centre provided, upon request, capacity-building assistance, training, legal support, technical assistance and outreach and advocacy functions to ensure the national implementation of global and regional instruments in the areas of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. Also during the reporting period, the Regional Centre undertook assistance programmes or packages in response to 13 new requests for assistance from Member States and partners and over 26 requests received during previous reporting periods. The assistance packages comprised more than 53 individual substantive activities.

The Regional Centre provided practical assistance to countries in the region through three such subregional assistance packages and supported the strengthening of capacity of 12 countries in the areas of stockpile management and destruction of small arms and light weapons. The Centre also assisted in the training of some 350 security sector officers in 16 States in combating the illicit trafficking in small arms, ammunition and explosives. Furthermore, it assisted 17 States in reviewing and harmonizing their national legislation on small arms and light weapons. In addition, the Centre contributed to strengthening transparency and confidence-building by

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promoting the participation of States of the region in relevant United Nations instruments, such as the United Nations Register on Conventional Arms and the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures. The Regional Centre also promoted the implementation of various disarmament and non-proliferation instruments related to weapons of mass destruction, including Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

The Secretary-General wishes to express his gratitude to those Member States and other partners that supported the Centre's operations and programmes with financial and in-kind contributions, and calls upon those in a position to do so to make voluntary contributions to the Centre to enable it to fulfil its mandate entrusted by the General Assembly.

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 66/54, the General Assembly reiterated its strong support for the role of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean in the promotion of United Nations activities at the regional and subregional levels to strengthen peace, disarmament, stability, security and development among its member States. The Assembly further expressed its satisfaction for the activities carried out in the past year by the Regional Centre, and requested the Centre to continue to take into account the proposals to be submitted by the countries of the region for the promotion of, inter alia, confidence-building measures, arms control and limitation, transparency, the reduction and prevention of armed violence, disarmament and development at the regional and subregional levels.

2. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on the implementation of the resolution at its sixty-seventh session. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request and covers the activities of the Regional Centre from July 2011 to June 2012. A financial statement on the status of the Trust Fund for the Regional Centre for 2011 is contained in the annex to the report.

II. Functioning and mandate

3. The United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, located in Lima, was established in 1987 pursuant to General Assembly resolution 41/60 J. It is part of the Regional Disarmament Branch of the Office for Disarmament Affairs. The Centre is mandated to provide, upon request, substantive support for the initiatives and other activities of the Member States in the region for the implementation of measures for peace and disarmament and for the promotion of economic and social development.

III. Regional context

4. During the reporting period, public and human security as well as armed violence and disarmament themes continued to dominate the national and regional agendas of States in the region. States reaffirmed in various forums their long-standing support for disarmament and non-proliferation and increased their commitment to support programmes designed to combat the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons as well as to prevent and reduce armed violence. While international and regional security concerns dominated the multilateral agenda, public security and human security were among the priorities addressed during electoral campaigns throughout the region. Comprehensive policy programmes on public and human security were proposed with a view to addressing crucial citizen security concerns.

5. States members of the Central American Integration System (SICA) were particularly active in addressing the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons and the cycle of armed violence through the implementation of the Central American Security Strategy, launched on 22 and 23 June 2011. The Strategy places specific emphasis on the development of policies, programmes, strategies and actions in order to prevent armed violence, particularly as it relates to youth and

gender-based violence. These objectives are in line with those of the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, adopted on 7 June 2006.

6. At the thirty-second Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), held from 30 June to 4 July 2011 in Saint Kitts and Nevis, members adopted the CARICOM Declaration on Small Arms and Light Weapons. In the Declaration, leaders reiterated the commitment of States to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons through the full implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects[1] of 2001 and, in particular, the management of weapons stockpiles, including the identification and destruction of surplus weapons. Also in the Declaration, leaders affirmed the engagement of CARICOM member States to conclude a legally binding arms trade treaty. The issue of armed violence remains a significant one for the Caribbean region, and it is being addressed by the Armed Violence Prevention Programme, an inter-agency coordination and programming working group of which the Office for Disarmament Affairs and its Regional Centre is a member.

7. The States members of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) intensified their efforts to undertake confidence- and security-building measures, including the compilation of data on military and defence expenditures. On 10 May 2012, UNASUR launched the South American Register of Defence Expenditures, which is a regional complement to the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures.

8. The Andean Community States also pursued their commitment to implementing the Andean Plan to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (Andean decision No. 552). In particular, States developed and implemented national action plans to implement the Programme of Action on Small Arms.

9. On 14 February 2012, the States members of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) celebrated the forty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

10. Member States sought the legal, policy and technical assistance of the Regional Centre with a view to strengthening national capacities and effectively addressing the persistent presence and proliferation of small arms and light weapons as well as the levels of arms violence and insecurity. That assistance is in line and coordinated with the various regional and subregional strategies outlined above.

IV. Main areas of activities

11. As the United Nations entity mandated to address disarmament and non-proliferation issues at the regional level in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Regional Centre assisted Member States in their efforts to implement the various global, regional and subregional instruments by strengthening State capacity and providing legal, technical, policy and substantive support. In concrete terms, this

[1] A/CONF.192/15.

support translates into capacity-building and training; legal, policy and technical assistance; and awareness-raising, information and advocacy.

12. The Regional Centre provided assistance to States in the management and the securing of national weapons stockpiles and in the identification and destruction of surplus, obsolete or seized weapons and ammunition. Over the course of the reporting period the Centre strengthened the capacity of nine States in the Andean, Central American and the Caribbean regions and destroyed 3,600 small arms and 7.2 tons of ammunition.

13. In keeping with the award-winning success of its Inter-Institutional Course on Combating Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives and the increasing number of requests from States for such training, the Regional Centre delivered five of the courses in Central America and the Caribbean, resulting in the adoption and integration of the curricula into the academic portfolios of two national professional training institutes. The knowledge imparted and applied by trained officials contributed to ensuring the seizure and interception of illicit weapons, as reported by States.

14. A specialized training course on combating illicit trafficking in firearms, ammunition and explosives for legal practitioners, adapted by the Regional Centre, was launched for States members of the Andean Community in 2011. By specifically developing this innovative course for justice officers, the Centre responded to numerous requests by States for programmes to reduce the levels of impunity in trial cases of illicit small arms trafficking, to strengthen the capacity of the security sector and to ensure the full implementation of regional and international norms in combating the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons at the national level.

15. Following similar requests for assistance from other Member States, the Regional Centre expanded its legal assistance to address the diverse challenges to public security. The Centre undertook a comparative legal analysis on the control and regulation of private security companies in the region. It also completed 13 legal analyses of the degree of harmonization of national legislation with international instruments on small arms and light weapons and drafted two legal commentaries on proposed national legislation on small arms and light weapons for Central and South America and for the Caribbean.

16. On issues related to weapons of mass destruction, the Regional Centre promoted the national implementation of disarmament and non-proliferation instruments. The Centre launched a new partnership with the Verification Research Training and Information Centre to assist States in the drafting of national legislation related to weapons of mass destruction, in compliance with their treaty obligations. The Centre also supported regional coordination efforts on those issues and continued to provide information and advocacy assistance on those instruments, in particular for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

17. Voluntary contributions from donors continued to be critical in enabling the Regional Centre to carry out these activities and to provide continuous support to the Member States of the region. It is noteworthy that the Centre widened its funding basis by securing new donors, many of which are States of the region.

A. Management of weapons stockpiles

18. Safe and secure stockpile management is a key measure for States to combat the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, in particular by preventing the diversion of weapons into the illicit market. Safer storage facilities improve the safety of personnel and communities by limiting the risk of accidental stockpile explosions that can harm innocent people living in close proximity to military, police, judicial or private security installations. Adequate stockpile management should also include record-keeping, marking and tracing, information management, transparency and good governance.

19. The Regional Centre strengthened and supported the efforts of States to improve stockpile safety and security through the provision of technical assistance and training and the delivery of stockpile management equipment. The Centre also promoted the use by States of inventory management or record-keeping tools, in compliance with international guidelines, best practices and standard operating protocols.

20. The Regional Centre's technical experts collaborated with States to review and implement standard operating protocols in specific stockpile facilities. Eleven voluntary joint assessments were undertaken by the Centre in Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, the Bahamas, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guatemala, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago. The assessments were carried out in collaboration with national authorities to evaluate the implementation by States of stockpile management standards. These standards include technical issues such as accounting, inventory management, infrastructure, security, marking, training, fire safety, emergency planning and disposal or destruction. The findings from the assessments contributed to the elaboration of improvement plans that ranged from the overhaul of individual facilities to that of the entire national stockpile management system. In that regard, the Centre assisted in significantly reducing the risk of accidental stockpile explosions in these 11 States as well as in preventing the diversion of small arms and light weapons from legitimate weapon holdings into the illicit market.

21. In August 2011, the Regional Centre supported Guatemala in securing the weapons stockpile facility of the Office of the Public Prosecutor by providing practical and technical recommendations. The majority of weapons contained in the stockpile facility are related to cases awaiting judicial process. By supporting national efforts to safeguard such weapons, the Centre contributed to the prevention of impunity in small arms trafficking cases.

22. Furthermore, 114 security sector officers from Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were trained on stockpile management, with a particular focus on securing physical location, risk analysis, security measures and accounting. The training course will be shared with other security sector officers in those countries to ensure that universal and standardized practices are employed at the national level.

23. In February 2012, as part of its Caribbean Firearms Destruction and Stockpile Management Assistance Package, the Regional Centre strengthened the security infrastructure of 34 Government stockpile facilities in eight States: the Bahamas, Belize, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago. The Centre supplied 320 industrial

padlocks to improve the safety and security of stockpiles and to limit the diversion of weapons into the illicit market.

24. June 2012 marked a milestone for the Regional Centre, with the negotiation of a funding agreement with Argentina to carry out technical assistance for stockpile management within the context of the United Nation Development Assistance Framework. It is noteworthy that the Centre will be implementing an initiative supported and funded by an assistance-recipient State, Argentina, within the "One United Nations" framework. The Centre will provide its technical expertise in assessing seven federal stockpile facilities in Argentina against the Centre's best practices, the International Small Arms Control Standards and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines. The assessment will serve as a basis for the development of an improvement plan for managing stockpiles and training stockpile officers. Finally, the assistance will contain a seminar on lessons learned, with the aim of reviewing the progress made in executing the improvement plan.

25. The marking of weapons and ammunition is an additional tool to prevent the diversion of weapons into the illicit market and to address instances of illicit trafficking. In that regard, the Regional Centre integrated the International Small Arms Control Standards and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines on marking and tracing into its stockpile management guidelines to support the technical capacity of States. These technical guidelines will aid in processing requests to trace small arms and ammunition found at crime scenes and confiscated in operations, and in that way will combat illicit trafficking in small arms. The standard operating protocols and guidelines have been integrated into all three of the Centre's Regional Assistance Packages for the Andean, Caribbean and Central American regions.

B. Weapons destruction

26. Weapons destruction is irreversible and thus represents a good practice to ensure that obsolete, surplus or seized small arms and light weapons do not threaten the lives of persons or the security of communities. It is an essential measure that States can adopt, in conjunction with disarmament campaigns, to prevent and reduce armed violence and combat the illicit trafficking in small arms, light weapons, ammunition and explosives. The Regional Centre assists States in their destruction of surplus, obsolete and seized small arms and light weapons in compliance with international agreements, norms and guidelines through the provision of technical assistance and destruction equipment, as well as training.

27. During the reporting period, the Regional Centre contributed to the destruction of 4,690 small arms and 7.2 tons of ammunition, which were thus permanently removed from circulation throughout the region. The Centre trained 205 officers in stockpile management and in weapons and ammunition destruction. It also assisted States in adopting 15 standard operating procedures. The impact of those measures is clear: fewer weapons are available in the streets and there is less probability of diversion into illicit channels. This constitutes a significant contribution to reducing armed violence and thus to creating safer communities.

28. The initiatives on stockpile management and weapons destruction carried out in the Caribbean States were made possible owing to the ongoing financial support provided by the United States of America, while the destruction activities in the Central American and Andean regions were sponsored by Canada, Spain and Sweden.

Small arms destruction

29. In order to assist States in complying with international technical norms for weapons destruction, the Regional Centre drafted the above-mentioned 15 standard operating procedures that strengthen States' capacity to combat illicit small arms in a practical and sustainable way and ensure that international norms are applied at the national level. The Centre integrated the International Small Arms Control Standards into these procedures, which serve to prioritize which weapons need to be destroyed and in which order and provide a technical guide to States on how best to manage weapons inventories, record the loss or recovery of weapons, comply with security requirements during destructions and dispose of waste following destruction. The standard operating procedures developed by the Centre for weapons destruction were implemented by Ecuador, Guatemala, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.

30. At a national public destruction event organized by the Regional Centre, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago presided over the destruction of 1,160 seized and surplus small arms and of 430 magazines. Following their destruction using rotating disc saws, the weapons were smelted at a smelter plant to be converted into recyclable metal.

31. In Jamaica in February 2012, some 1,950 surplus and confiscated small arms were destroyed using a rotary kiln furnace at a local cement factory. The pulverized weapons were then used as a component in the cement mix. This recycling process contributes to economic growth and promotes innovative approaches by the Regional Centre to foster private-public partnerships.

32. In addition, the Regional Centre provided eight Caribbean States with hydraulic shears, a basic piece of small arms destruction equipment. This need for such equipment was identified in the respective national action plans on small arms of States. The shears are an efficient, cost-effective, sustainable and environmentally friendly way of destroying weapons of all sizes and types. These shears will ensure the national ownership and sustainability of weapons destruction capabilities. The Centre trained officers on the use of the hydraulic shears, and a total of 530 weapons were destroyed in the training phase.

Destruction of small arms ammunition

33. In order to address the varying levels of State capacity to undertake weapons destruction, the Regional Centre developed a variety of destruction techniques taking into account cost-benefit analyses and the environmental impact. The Centre designed and commissioned a low-maintenance, low-technology small arms ammunition burning tank, which it provided to four States in the region: the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The burning tank will be used by States in their periodic destruction of certain types of ammunition appropriate for burning. Security sector officers were trained by the Centre to operate the burning tank using the standard operating procedures, which are in line with the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines.

34. Trinidad and Tobago was the first State in the region to make use of the burning tank, in October 2011, to destroy five tons of surplus and confiscated small arms ammunition, followed in April 2012 by an additional 16,860 rounds of ammunition. Six officers from the defence force, police service, coast guard and

prisons service were trained in the operations of the burning tank. Finally, in June 2012, Trinidad and Tobago security forces destroyed 1,130 small arms.

35. In February 2012, the burning tank was used by Jamaican authorities, with the assistance of the Regional Centre, to destroy approximately 12,000 rounds of surplus and confiscated small arms ammunition and to train an officer from the defence force on the standard operating procedures and operation of the burning tank.

36. In December 2011, in Ecuador, the Regional Centre designed and monitored, for the national authorities, the building of a burning tank. Using the burning tank, the Ecuadorian Armed Forces, together with the Centre, destroyed 1.5 tons of obsolete small arms ammunition. Four national officers were trained using the Centre's standard operating procedures relating to the disposal of ammunition and on the use of the burning tank. These officers are preparing to train additional personnel on the use of the burning tank for future destruction events to be carried out independently by this State. Following the success of the initial destruction activities, Ecuador decided to build additional burning tanks to equip major ammunition stockpiles throughout the country.

37. The Regional Centre assisted the national authorities in the Dominican Republic in the destruction of more than 8 tons of small arms ammunition by completing the construction and installation of a burning tank.

38. Each of the above-mentioned States that have received the burning tanks now possess a sustainable national capacity in ammunition destruction, with the appropriate operating procedures and destruction systems, thus contributing to combating the illicit trafficking in small arms and to preventing and reducing armed violence.

C. Capacity-building in the security sector

39. The Regional Centre assisted the States of the region to combat illicit small arms trafficking, in particular their diversion into illicit markets, by providing practical and concrete tools for security sector personnel. The Centre's trainings are aligned with and contribute to the implementation of the regional strategic priorities, such as, inter alia, the Central American Security Strategy developed by SICA member States.

40. During the reporting period, a total of 280 security sector personnel from 13 States were trained using the Regional Centre's Inter-Institutional Course on Combating Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives. Following such a course in El Salvador in July 2011, in partnership with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Regional Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean and the UNDP country office, the contents of the Regional Centre's course manual were endorsed by the Academic Council of the National Public Security Academy of El Salvador. Thus the training curriculum will now form part of the permanent training for police officers in El Salvador. This constitutes an additional step in ensuring the sustainability, national ownership and standardization of practical disarmament measures against illicit small arms.

41. In the Dominican Republic, the Regional Centre trained 54 security sector officials in November 2011. The course assisted in enhancing the cooperation

among the various institutions of the national security sector and constituted an essential element in effectively combating illicit trafficking in small arms.

42. Both of the courses were made possible owing to the generous support of the Governments of Spain and Sweden.

43. The Regional Centre adapted and tailored its course to specifically suit the Caribbean region with a view to training security sector officers from that region. This training was conducted by the Centre in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, in partnership with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

44. The first English version of the course manual was launched at the October 2011 Inter-Institutional Course on Combating Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives training in Trinidad and Tobago, at which 62 security sector officers were trained. The manual takes into account the high levels of crime and violence currently observed in the subregion, notably with considerably higher homicide rates than in other regions. Owing to its evident usefulness, the Police Academy of Trinidad and Tobago decided that the course would be permanently integrated into its curricula and academic syllabus.

45. At the national Inter-Institutional Course on Combating Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives training in Jamaica, 57 officers were trained to combat the illicit trafficking in small arms, ammunition and explosives, to prevent licit weapons from entering illicit markets and to reduce the levels of impunity in arms-trafficking cases. In the months following the training in Jamaica, an illicit shipment of arms was successfully intercepted by aviation security officials who had taken part in the January training. This incident prompted the Director of Aviation Security of Jamaica to request the Centre to assist in incorporating the training into airport security training.

46. Following the objectives of the Gender Mainstreaming Action Plan of the Office for Disarmament Affairs and as part of the gender policy of the Regional Centre, the Centre has continued to request States to nominate a minimum number of women security sector officers to take part in all of its training in connection with the Inter-Institutional Course on Combating Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives. This ensures the increased participation of women in peace and security efforts and promotes gender equality in the elaboration and implementation of small arms-related laws and programmes. In that respect, it is worth noting that the Centre's efforts were successful in ensuring the participation of women: Jamaica nominated 19 women officers, representing 33.3 per cent of the number of participants, to take part in the national training. This is the highest percentage of women participants since the start of that training in the Caribbean region.

47. In April 2012, more than 50 security sector officers from 12 Caribbean States participated in the first subregional Inter-Institutional Course on Combating Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives. In addition to including the standard topics, such as practical disarmament measures, small arms investigative techniques, intelligence-gathering, crime scene management and the tracing and preparation of evidence in criminal proceedings, the course also covered cross-cutting issues relating to the use of force, gender awareness and child protection. For the first time, the course incorporated a new module on identifying armed personnel, as well as on conducting container searches at the port of entry. The new

module is the result of a partnership between the Regional Centre and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

48. The Regional Centre is pioneering the integration of a module on small arms control in a maritime border context. This new module is based on requests received by Caribbean States. An expert round table on maritime security was held in Lima in August 2011, with funding from Canada. It developed a pilot version of this module, which was implemented during the subregional Inter-Institutional Course on Combating Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives training for the Caribbean region, held in April 2012. As a result of a second expert round table for Caribbean States in June 2012, with funding from Australia, Canada and New Zealand, the module has been further developed. This second expert round table also served to provide input on the issue of maritime security from a uniquely Caribbean perspective into the second United Nations Small Arms Review Conference, to be held in 2012. Those efforts built on the discussions held by Member States in 2011 during the Open-ended Meeting of Governmental Experts on the Implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons.

Capacity-building for legal practitioners

49. The Regional Centre used the Inter-Institutional Course on Combating Illicit Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives methodology to create an innovative four-day specialized training course for justice officers aimed at familiarizing that branch of the security sector with the combat against the illicit trafficking in small arms and at reducing impunity in cases of trafficking. The idea for the course originated from requests by States to address the high levels of impunity in illicit small arms trafficking cases in the region. The course provides justice officers (including judges, prosecutors and other legal operators) with the necessary tools for the effective prosecution of illicit small arms trafficking offences. This strengthens State capacity to effectively implement global and regional small arms instruments. As with all training assistance programmes, the Centre promotes the incorporation of course material and format into the national training curricula. Peru was the first country in the region to benefit from the course in December 2011. Subsequently, the Public Prosecutor of Peru indicated an interest to include the course into the annual training curriculum of justice officials. The Centre has received requests from Member States to implement the course in Central America and the Caribbean States.

D. Legal assistance and policy support

Legal assistance

50. In the absence of adequate legal frameworks, States are unable to properly combat the illicit trafficking in small arms. As called for in the Programme of Action on Small Arms, the harmonization of national legislation with international and regional small arms instruments is necessary to ensure a standardized and effective legal response to this scourge.

51. During the reporting period, the Regional Centre carried out 13 legal studies in Central and South American and Caribbean States. Twelve of the studies were carried out in cooperation with and funding from the Organization of American States (OAS). The Centre further assisted States in revising their existing national

small arms legislation with a view to identifying and addressing legal gaps in legislation and thus avoiding impunity in cases related to illicit small arms trafficking. The Central and South American legal studies were presented in September 2011 and May 2012 within the framework of the meetings of the Inter-American Convention Against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms.

52. The Regional Centre also provided assistance to States in reviewing their draft national legislation on small arms. During the reporting period, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela requested the Centre to provide legal recommendations with a view to improving its national legal frameworks related to small arms. A similar activity was also carried out in the Plurinational State of Bolivia. As a complement to those legal studies and recommendations, in the Dominican Republic, in November 2011, and in the Plurinational State of Bolivia, in April 2012, the Centre held national legal workshops with legislators and policymakers to disseminate the draft legislation and outline its legal recommendations as these relate to the international small arms instruments.

53. Following the Regional Centre's legal recommendations on draft national legislation, the Dominican Republic and Panama passed new national legislation on small arms, which incorporated in significant part the Centre's recommendations on the harmonization of these laws with the provisions found in international and regional instruments on small arms. Furthermore, the Centre's legal study for Jamaica issued in 2011 was used as the basis for that Member State's legal and policy reform on armed violence prevention and illicit small arms control. While this reform is still ongoing, preliminary impacts have been reported by national authorities, such as a considerable reduction in murder rates per capita. It is expected that this trend will continue to improve over the short and long term.

54. Parliamentarians, policymakers and members of national commissions on small arms also benefited from the policy support of the Regional Centre, as was the case in Peru and Ecuador in September 2011 at national high-level policy meetings to improve progress in the design and development of national action plans on the implementation of the Programme of Action on Small Arms. In the case of Ecuador, the Centre focused its technical assistance on designing and implementing national disarmament campaigns. Meanwhile, in Peru, the main objective was to establish a dialogue with the new governmental authorities on approaches to armed violence prevention and reduction and on practical disarmament tools available to combat the illicit trafficking in small arms.

Private security

55. There has been exponential growth in private security companies in the Latin American and Caribbean region. Currently, there are approximately 3 million private security guards employed throughout the region, a high percentage of whom work informally and possess and use between 800,000 and 1.3 million small arms.[2] Operating in parallel to the public security forces, these private agencies have gained such momentum that discussing public security matters without addressing their activities and role throughout the region is no longer possible.

56. In response to requests by Member States for measures to improve their capacity to put in place appropriate legal frameworks to ensure that private security

[2] *Small Arms Survey 2011: States of Security* (Geneva, 2011).

companies operate within the rule of law, the Regional Centre published a comparative legal analysis on the control and regulation of private security companies in the region. The analysis was presented during a seminar on private security and the rule of law in Lima in August 2011. This was the first time that the disarmament community, Government officials and private security representatives had come together to assess the impact of private security companies on combating the illicit trafficking in and proliferation of small arms. This new community of practice also explored minimum standards for stockpile management, oversight, training and regulations relating to the use of small arms by private security companies.

E. Disarmament advocacy

Public security

57. The political expertise and guidance of the Regional Centre was requested in the area of arms control and at public security debates in Andean, Caribbean and Southern Cone States. The Centre's small arms expertise was also shared among security sector reform trainers at the annual meeting of the Association of Security Sector Education and Training, in April 2012. The Centre, using its field perspective experience, contributed to the development of Integrated Technical Guidance Notes on Security Sector Reform by participating in the inter-agency Security Sector Reform Task Force.

58. In October 2011, the Global Foundation for Democracy and Development invited the Regional Centre to share its experience in combating the illicit trafficking in firearms, and in reducing and preventing armed violence, at the Third International Conference on Security and Defence. At the Conference, held in the Dominican Republic, the Centre also engaged in a dialogue with members of regional civil society on citizen and public security issues.

59. In November 2011, the Ministry of Security of Argentina and the UNDP country office invited the Regional Centre to share its expert advice on the role of small arms control and armed violence reduction as they relate to citizen security policies, at a seminar on the planning for and implementing of citizen security strategies in Argentina.

60. The Regional Centre shared its small arms expertise at two meetings sponsored jointly by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, both held in November 2011, in Colombia. The first meeting was a platform for debate among Latin American parliamentarians on issues of defence and security; the second meeting brought together academics from international and governmental levels, and from non-governmental organizations to discuss the role of police and judicial reform in combating organized crime.

Gender mainstreaming

61. With a view to promoting the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security, General Assembly resolution 65/69 on women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control and of the Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Regional Centre, in collaboration

with the International Action Network on Small Arms and the Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation, conducted a women-only training course for civil society representatives. The training, which focused in particular on women working in the area of arms control, was organized in Lima in September 2011. In particular, the training addressed ways to ensure the participation of women in the elaboration and implementation of small arms-related laws, policies and programmes.

Disarmament and non-proliferation, in particular with regard to weapons of mass destruction

62. The Regional Centre assisted Member States during the reporting period in promoting State accession and adherence to disarmament and non-proliferation instruments and control regimes, in particular those relating to weapons of mass destruction.

63. In November 2011, in Lima, the Office for Disarmament Affairs, through both its Geneva Branch and the Regional Centre, held a regional workshop for the Latin American and Caribbean region on the Seventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. The workshop prepared Member States of the region for the Review Conference and identified ways to promote the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention at the national and regional levels.

64. The regional workshop also resulted in the development of a new partnership between the Regional Centre and the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre to assist States in the drafting of national legislation related to weapons of mass destruction, in compliance with their treaty obligations. Ecuador became the first recipient of this joint assistance at a legal workshop held in June 2012 to initiate the development of national legislation and discuss the implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention in the country. The workshop furthermore raised awareness among representatives from the various ministries on the need to implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), and to develop a comprehensive legal framework for both instruments.

65. In preparation for the Nuclear Security Summit, held in Seoul in March 2012, the Regional Centre participated in a regional meeting in Chile for the purpose of analysing and discussing the core issues of disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security from an academic perspective. The Centre highlighted the measures required to effectively implement resolution 1540 (2004) and their complementarity and interlinkages to other provisions of weapons of mass destruction instruments, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. The Centre highlighted both the fact that resolution 1540 (2004) specifically addresses the risk of non-State actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction and the contribution of that resolution to the entire non-proliferation regime.

66. The Regional Centre also shared regional experiences in the management of the transfer of sensitive weapons and technologies from a legal perspective, at a meeting hosted by Spain in Madrid in February 2012.

67. The Regional Centre is increasing its cooperation with UNASUR on issues related to trust- and confidence-building measures and the promotion of transparency measures in the region. In May 2012, at a regional confidence-building meeting organized by Ecuador and UNASUR, the Centre elaborated on the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and the United Nations Report on Military Expenditures, both mechanisms managed by the Office for Disarmament Affairs. At the same meeting, UNASUR member States presented their submissions to the recently created South American Register of Defence Expenditures, a welcome additional transparency instrument that will support the existing United Nations transparency and confidence-building instruments. It is worthwhile noting that since the creation of the Report on Military Expenditures, 25 out of the 33 Latin American and Caribbean States have submitted at least one report to the United Nations.

V. Staffing, financing and administration

A. Finances

68. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 41/60 J, the Regional Centre was established on the basis of existing resources and voluntary contributions made by Member States and interested organizations to support its core and programme activities. During the reporting period, voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund of the Regional Centre were received in the amount of $1,760,369. The Secretary-General wishes to express his gratitude to the donors of the Centre for their continued financial support, namely the Governments of Canada, Spain and the United States, and his appreciation for the new donors of the Centre, namely the Governments of Australia, Finland, Germany and New Zealand. The Secretary-General also wishes to express his appreciation for the financial contribution made by OAS to the Regional Centre.

69. The Secretary-General wishes to express his appreciation to the States of the region that have made financial contributions to the Regional Centre, namely the Governments of Mexico, Panama and Peru. The Centre saw a significant increase in direct financial contributions from Latin American and Caribbean States. This is a clear indication of the value that Member States place in the Centre.

70. The Regional Centre also benefited from close cooperation and joint undertakings with other key partners, such as UNDP, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Andean Community, OAS, CARICOM, SICA, UNASUR, the International Action Network on Small Arms, the Swedish Fellowship of Reconciliation and the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre. These partners provided the Centre with both in-kind and financial contributions as well as cost-sharing agreements that significantly assisted the Centre in implementing its activities.

71. In this regard, the Secretary-General wishes to thank Member States and partners for their generous financial contributions to the Regional Centre and encourages the ongoing support to ensure that the Centre would continue to expand both the scope and number of technical assistance activities rendered to Member States.

72. The cost of living in Lima, headquarters of the Regional Centre, has augmented, thus requiring additional resources. In this regard, the Secretary-General

wishes to thank the host country of the Centre for its annual contribution and calls upon Peru to continue to provide the necessary financial support to the Centre in order to offset the rise in its operating costs.

73. Information on the status of the Trust Fund for the Regional Centre for 2011 is contained in the annex to the present report.

B. Staffing and administration

74. During the period covered by the report, the Regional Centre continued to strengthen its team of experts by expanding its roster of technical experts on small arms and stockpile management issues, on weapons destruction, on legal and policy support and on training through a new online platform for potential experts to be included in a roster to be called upon for future activities. Finally, the stable core capacity of the Regional Centre was enhanced through the successful incumbency of two posts: a Political Affairs Officer and the programmatic post of Public Security Programme Coordinator.

75. The Regional Centre launched a communications strategy, which includes the redesign of the website and converting it into a modern disarmament e-resource tool that features a quarterly newsletter and an annual report on the activities of the Centre.

76. The Regional Centre continues to rely solely on voluntary financial contributions to develop and carry out all its programmes in the region in response to requests for assistance from Member States. In this connection, the Secretary-General would like to thank Member States and other donors for providing their valuable support in strengthening and maintaining the Centre's core staff.

VI. Conclusion

77. During the reporting period, the Regional Centre strengthened its close cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in order to continue to promote a coordinated approach to respond to requests for assistance expressed by Member States and to ensure the interplay between the international norm-setting and the national implementation.

78. During the reporting period, the Regional Centre undertook more than 53 substantive activities in the field of public security and disarmament advocacy. It also received 13 new requests for assistance from Member States and partners during the reporting period, while it continued to implement the over 26 requests received during the previous periods.

79. The Regional Centre provided expert assistance to Member States through its integrated approach to combating the illicit trafficking in small arms throughout the region. Activities included the strengthening of capacities in the security sector, technical assistance in stockpile management and destruction, border security and legal and policy support with a view to promoting and facilitating the implementation of disarmament and non-proliferation instruments.

80. Member States, United Nations partners and regional organizations placed great value in the assistance provided by the Regional Centre, which contributed to

policies and programmes that led to a reduction in illicit small arms and ammunition circulating in the region, an increase in successful weapons seizures and prosecutions in cases of illicit small arms trafficking, and to a renewed commitment by States in their implementation of disarmament and non-proliferation instruments.

81. The Secretary-General reiterates his call to Member States and other partners in a position to do so, to provide the Regional Centre with the necessary financial and in-kind support to ensure that it can continue to carry out its mandate effectively and serve the needs of Member States in the region.

Annex

Status of the Trust Fund for the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean for 2011

(United States dollars)

Reserves and fund balance, 1 January 2011	**1 645 138**
Income, 1 January-31 December 2011	
Voluntary contributions	1 486 571[a]
Funds received under inter-organizational arrangements	
Interest income	44 860
Other/miscellaneous income	
Total income	**1 531 431**
Expenditures	975 918
Programme support costs	126 869
Total expenditure	**1 102 787**
Reserves and fund balance, 31 December 2011	**2 073 782**[b]

Note: Information based on the statement of income and expenditure for 2011. During the period from 1 January to 22 May 2012, additional contributions totalling $407,481 were received from Canada ($106,610), Finland ($50,000), Germany ($170,001), Spain ($25,870) and the Organization of American States ($55,000).

[a] Contributions totalling $1,486,571 were received from: Canada ($494,245), Guyana ($1,000), Mexico ($10,000), Panama ($4,000), Peru ($30,000), Spain ($167,326), the United States of America ($725,000) and the Organization of American States ($55,000).

[b] Consists of reserves and fund balance, 1 January 2011, plus income received in 2011, less expenditures incurred during the year.

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General and complete disarmament

Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*

Reducing nuclear danger

Nuclear disarmament

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to requests contained in General Assembly resolutions 66/46, 66/48 and 66/51.

2. In paragraph 3 of resolution 66/46, the General Assembly requested all States to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures that they had taken on the implementation of the resolution and nuclear disarmament, and requested the Secretary-General to apprise the Assembly of that information at its sixty-seventh session.

3. In paragraph 5 of resolution 66/48, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to intensify efforts and support initiatives that would contribute towards the full implementation of the seven recommendations identified in the report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters that would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war (see A/56/400, para. 3), and also to continue to encourage Member States to consider the convening of an international conference, as proposed in the United Nations Millennium Declaration (General Assembly resolution 55/2), to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers, and to report thereon to the Assembly at its sixty-seventh session.

4. In paragraph 23 of resolution 66/51, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Assembly at its sixty-seventh session a report on the implementation of the resolution.

II. Observations

5. During the first half of 2012, the international community sought to take stock of the progress made in implementing existing nuclear disarmament and related commitments. The status of those undertakings was addressed at several major international meetings and conferences:

(a) From 30 April to 11 May 2012 in Vienna, the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons held the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty. The session was chaired by Ambassador Peter Woolcott of Australia and took place in a positive political atmosphere as Governments sought to carry forward the successful outcome of the 2010 Review Conference. In this connection, the Preparatory Committee was able to adopt its agenda at its first meeting and to move expeditiously to its general debate and focused substantive deliberations. The discussions generally centred on the implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference, including with respect to the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. While there was no agreement on the adoption of the Chair's factual summary, the session was generally considered to be a success;

(b) On 19 April 2012, the Security Council, under the presidency of the United States of America, convened a follow-up meeting to the September 2009 Security Council summit on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, which was chaired by the President of the United States, Barack Obama. In a statement delivered by the President of the Council (S/PRST/2012/14), the Council

reaffirmed that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery constituted a threat to international peace and security. The Council also expressed its support for existing international efforts to strengthen nuclear security with a view to preventing terrorists and other non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction or their means of delivery;

(c) On 26 and 27 March 2012, the Republic of Korea hosted the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit as a follow-up to the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit. The participating States adopted a communiqué that reaffirmed the commitments made in 2010 to enhance nuclear security and to prevent non-State actors from acquiring nuclear materials. The communiqué also addressed a number of new issues, including, inter alia, enhancing the security of sensitive information, improving the security of radiological sources and ensuring a synergistic and coherent approach to nuclear safety and nuclear security measures in nuclear facilities.

6. The international community saw progress in its efforts to seek the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as Indonesia, one of the States whose ratification is necessary for the Treaty to enter into force, deposited its instrument of ratification on 6 February 2012. On 23 September 2011 in New York, the signatory and ratifying States of the Treaty held the seventh Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty. The Conference, chaired by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Mexico and Sweden, adopted a final declaration and measures to promote the entry into force of the Treaty.

7. Nuclear-weapon States continued to take steps related to the implementation of their nuclear disarmament commitments and to increased transparency and accountability:

(a) On 27 and 28 June 2012 in Washington, D.C., the nuclear-weapon States held a further meeting aimed at implementing the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In particular, the nuclear-weapon States continued their previous discussions on the issues of transparency, mutual confidence and verification, and considered proposals aimed at the development of a standard form for reporting information on their nuclear-weapon programmes. The nuclear-weapon States agreed on a workplan for a working group, to be chaired by China, that would develop a glossary of definitions for key nuclear terms that would increase mutual understanding and facilitate further discussions on nuclear matters;

(b) At its twenty-fifth summit, held in Chicago on 20 and 21 May 2012, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) endorsed the outcome of its Deterrence and Defence Posture Review and reaffirmed that its strategic nuclear forces provided the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies, while also reaffirming their resolve to seek to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons. With respect to non-strategic nuclear weapons, NATO committed to develop transparency and confidence-building ideas with the Russian Federation and to further consider what reciprocal actions by the Russian Federation would allow for significant reductions in its forward-based non-strategic nuclear weapons;

(c) On 21 February 2012, India and Pakistan agreed to extend for an additional five years the bilateral Agreement on Reducing the Risk from Accidents

Relating to Nuclear Weapons, which was set to expire on that day. The Agreement is a confidence-building measure aimed at improving national measures and the sharing of information in the event of an accident involving nuclear weapons. The two countries were unable to extend the Agreement on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles for another five years.

8. Some Governments initiated new efforts aimed at advancing nuclear disarmament objectives and facilitating the implementation of the conclusions and recommendations agreed to at the 2010 Review Conference:

(a) At the 2012 session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a newly established group of 16 States parties[1] issued a joint statement on the humanitarian dimensions of nuclear disarmament. The group reaffirmed its grave concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and called upon all Treaty States parties, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to give increasing attention to their commitment to comply with international law and international humanitarian law. In this connection, Norway announced its intention to convene a conference in Oslo in 2013 to address the humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons;

(b) On 22 September 2011 in New York, 10 members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative[2] held their third ministerial meeting, at which they, inter alia, took stock of the implementation of their proposals. Following from the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, the Initiative has engaged with the nuclear-weapon States to facilitate the implementation of their nuclear disarmament commitments, including the development of a standard form for reporting information on their nuclear-weapon programmes. On 16 June 2012 in Istanbul, the Initiative held its fourth ministerial meeting, and in a joint ministerial statement, inter alia, pledged to continue their engagement with the nuclear-weapon States on the implementation of the nuclear disarmament commitments, to consider options should the Conference on Disarmament fail to implement a comprehensive programme of work in 2012, and to develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with partners who could contribute to their efforts;

(c) On 12 and 13 October 2011 in Astana, Kazakhstan hosted the International Forum for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World, at which the Declaration on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World was adopted. The Declaration sought to reinforce the message that all States possessing nuclear weapons should pursue steps towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible time. It encouraged negotiations on further steps leading to nuclear disarmament and emphasized the importance of the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and increasing transparency in a way that promoted international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security for all.

9. Despite the above-mentioned efforts, the number of nuclear weapons in national arsenals remains high, with thousands of warheads maintained on high-alert

[1] Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Holy See, Egypt, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Philippines, South Africa and Switzerland.

[2] Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates.

status and available for launch within a short period of time. Although some nuclear-weapon States and members of NATO have sought to further reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies, a number of States remain committed to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence based on the contemplated first use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon States have reportedly continued to modernize their nuclear arsenals and nuclear-weapon delivery systems, including through qualitative and quantitative improvements.

10. Disagreements over the issue of missile defence have increasingly emerged as possible impediments to progress in global nuclear disarmament efforts. In March 2011, the United States announced the deployment of an Aegis missile cruiser to the Mediterranean as an initial component of the European Phased Adaptive Approach to ballistic missile defence. At its May 2012 summit in Chicago, NATO announced that the Approach had achieved an interim capability. The Russian Federation in particular continued to express its concerns about the plans to place anti-missile interceptors in Europe. Despite efforts made in 2011 to address these concerns in the NATO-Russia Council, in November 2011 the Russian Federation announced the decision to, inter alia, deploy short-range and conventionally armed Iskander missiles in the region of Kaliningrad.

11. The Conference on Disarmament, at its 2012 session, was again unable to begin either negotiations or substantive deliberations on the basis of an agreed programme of work, despite seemingly promising attempts made early in the session. In particular, under the presidency of Egypt, the Conference considered a new proposal for a programme of work during the 2012 session (see CD/1933/Rev.1) that would have established working groups under each of the four core items. While there was widespread support for the approach set forth in this proposal, there was no consensus within the Conference on its adoption, as one delegation in particular voiced opposition. Following the practice of recent sessions, the Conference has held informal discussions on each of the items on its agenda. In the light of the ongoing stalemate in the Conference, an increasing number of States have expressed interest in exploring alternatives for advancing multilateral disarmament negotiations and many will look to the present session of the General Assembly for action in this regard.

12. In 2012, the United Nations Disarmament Commission began a new three-year cycle, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Enrique Román-Morey of Peru. After extensive consultations, the Commission agreed to the agenda items for this cycle, which include "Recommendations for achieving the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" and "Practical confidence-building measures in the field of conventional weapons". The Commission also agreed to hold two informal meetings, devoted to the elements for a declaration of the 2010s as the fourth Disarmament Decade and to the working methods of the Commission.

13. The Secretary-General and the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs have continued their efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation globally through direct interactions with Governments, civil society and parliamentarians, advocacy and other outreach activities. The Secretary-General has also sought to address emerging issues such as international efforts to improve nuclear safety and security, including through the preparation of a United Nations system-wide study on the implications of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi

nuclear power plant and the convening of the High-level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security. In this connection, the Secretary-General has taken the opportunity to emphasize in particular the need to eliminate nuclear weapons at important intergovernmental forums, such as the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit and the 19 April 2012 debate of the Security Council on nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and security.

III. Information received from Governments

14. By a note verbale dated 10 February 2012, all Member States were invited to inform the Secretary-General by 31 May 2012 of the efforts and measures that they had taken with regard to the implementation of resolution 66/46, concerning the follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*. To date, Austria, Cuba and Turkmenistan have sent replies, the texts of which are reproduced below. Additional replies received from Member States will be issued as addenda to the present report.

Austria

[Original: English]
[31 May 2012]

The Austrian Government has consistently supported nuclear disarmament efforts. With respect to Austria's commitment to pursue a world without nuclear weapons, it is particularly noteworthy that in 1999, the Austrian Parliament adopted a constitutional law (149/1999) on "a nuclear-free Austria". In its article 1, the law stipulates that "It is prohibited to produce, stockpile, transfer, test or use a nuclear weapon in Austria. It is further prohibited to establish installations for the stockpiling of nuclear weapons in Austria."

More recently, Austria's Federal President stated, on the occasion of the September 2009 Security Council summit, that "the prospect of a world without nuclear weapons must become a goal shared by all States. Austria supports the idea of a nuclear weapons convention". Moreover, in March 2010 the Austrian Parliament adopted a decision supported by all parties calling on the Government to work for a world without nuclear weapons and support the Secretary-General's five-point plan.

Austria strongly supports the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions agreed upon at the 2012 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In this context, Austria has been particularly engaged in overcoming the dysfunction of the United Nations disarmament machinery, in particular of the Conference on Disarmament, and the resulting lack of substantive multilateral disarmament negotiations. In 2011, Austria, together with Norway and Mexico, presented a draft resolution to the General Assembly with the aim of taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations, which in the end was not put to a vote. Given the persistent stalemate, Austria is committed to continue efforts to take forward multilateral disarmament negotiations.

Austria would also like to underscore the importance of the recognition, contained in the Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference, of the

catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and the need to comply at all times with international law and international humanitarian law. In this context, Austria, together with a group of like-minded States, presented a joint statement on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament at the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference. Austria is convinced of the need to fundamentally change the discourse on nuclear weapons and to foster the understanding that any use of nuclear weapons would be morally repugnant and devastating in its effects for the whole world and all of humankind. Consequently, Austria is of the view that it is difficult to envisage how any use of nuclear weapons could be compatible with international law, in particular with fundamental principles of international humanitarian law.

Cuba

[Original: Spanish/English]
[30 May 2012]

More than 15 years have elapsed since the International Court of Justice issued its historic advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.

However, very little progress has been made towards achieving the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Humankind still runs the risk of annihilation as a result of the existence and potential use of more than 20,000 nuclear weapons.

It is disturbing that the use of this kind of weapon remains a fundamental part of the military doctrines of certain nuclear Powers and that their use might be considered even against non-nuclear-weapon States in response to attacks using non-nuclear weapons.

In accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, nuclear-weapon States have a legal obligation not only to pursue but also to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international verification.

Paradoxically, some of the nuclear Powers limit the nuclear problem to the issue of horizontal non-proliferation, to the detriment of nuclear disarmament, while they themselves are updating their nuclear arsenals in what amounts to vertical proliferation.

The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NAM), of which Cuba is honoured to be a member, has reaffirmed on several occasions the importance of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.

Cuba is a State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the international treaties on chemical and biological weapons. In the United Nations General Assembly, it supports resolutions that advocate the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Cuba is in favour of giving priority to commencing negotiations on a phased programme for nuclear disarmament, culminating in the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The use of nuclear weapons constitutes a flagrant violation of international standards on the prevention of genocide and on environmental protection. Cuba maintains that the use of nuclear weapons is completely immoral and cannot be justified by any concept or security doctrine.

Pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, a legally binding international instrument must be concluded, as a matter of priority, whereby nuclear-weapon States commit not to use or threaten to use such weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

The existence of nuclear weapons is one of the main challenges to the survival of the human species. At present, there are more than 20,500 nuclear weapons, 5,000 of which are deployed and ready for use. The use of only a fraction of this arsenal would bring about a nuclear winter resulting in the end of life on Earth.

Cuba is extremely concerned that nuclear deterrence continues to be a core part of the defence and security doctrines of some Powers, and the basis for allocating many millions of dollars for the development of new types of nuclear weapons.

In the last 10 years, military expenditure has increased by more than 49 per cent to reach the astronomical figure of 1.74 trillion dollars.

Nuclear disarmament remains the highest disarmament priority, as Cuba has stated repeatedly and at the highest level; a position shared by the leaders of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

The Non-Aligned Movement has submitted a proposal that deserves consideration and contains a plan of action calling for a well-defined schedule for the gradual reduction of nuclear weapons until their complete elimination and prohibition by no later than 2025.

On 28 July 2011 the International Relations Committee of the National Assembly of the People's Power of the Republic of Cuba adopted a statement on Peace and Nuclear Disarmament which calls upon all of the world's legislative bodies to promote practical steps towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, so as to ensure that future generations can live in a peaceful world free of nuclear weapons.

On 3 December 2011 the Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) adopted a special communiqué on the total elimination of nuclear weapons, expressing their strong commitment to the task of convening an international high-level conference to identify ways and methods of eliminating nuclear weapons as soon as possible.

Cuba strongly supports the convening, at the earliest opportunity, of a high-level meeting on nuclear disarmament to determine the necessary steps for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, within a specified time frame, and to prohibit their development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use, and to achieve their destruction.

Pending the achievement of the goal of nuclear disarmament, it is of paramount importance to begin, as a matter of priority, international negotiations to conclude a treaty offering universal and unconditional security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States concerning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty — disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy — must be observed strictly and without discrimination or double standards.

Nuclear non-proliferation is not an end in itself but rather a means of attaining nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon States cannot continue calling for the non-nuclear-weapon States to assume ever more stringent non-proliferation commitments when they are not serious about fulfilling their disarmament obligations.

Cuba strictly fulfils each and every one of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and other instruments. Cuba also participates in the International Atomic Energy Agency's Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) on illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material and, to date, has not reported any incident of this kind.

Safeguards inspections carried out in Cuba by IAEA have demonstrated our firm commitment to the use of nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes. This has been confirmed by IAEA in its reports on the application of safeguards around the world.

Specific measures should be taken to eliminate undue restrictions on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and on exports to developing countries of material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes. Cuba advocates respect for the choices and decisions of each State party with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Turkmenistan

[Original: Russian]
[6 June 2012]

As set out in articles 2 and 3 of the Constitutional Act on the Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan, of 27 December 1995, the adoption by Turkmenistan of permanent neutrality status shall not affect its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. Turkmenistan will contribute in every way towards attainment of the goals of the United Nations.

Turkmenistan recognizes the primacy of the United Nations and its decisions.

Turkmenistan is pursuing a peaceful foreign policy and developing its relations with other countries on the principles of equality, mutual respect and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.

In accordance with article 6 of the aforementioned Constitutional Act, Turkmenistan will not possess, produce or distribute nuclear, chemical, bacteriological or other weapons of mass destruction, nor shall foreign States establish military bases on its territory.

In accordance with part 8 of the Military Doctrine for an Independent and Permanently Neutral Turkmenistan, ratified by decree of the President of Turkmenistan on 21 January 2009, under the Constitution of Turkmenistan and the Constitutional Act on the Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan, Turkmenistan shall

recognize the primacy of the universally recognized standards and principles of international law, of the United Nations and of its decisions and, in its foreign policy, shall abide by the principles of permanent positive neutrality, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other States and the inviolability of their borders, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, non-use of force and non-participation in military blocs and alliances and the furthering of peaceful, friendly and mutually beneficial relations with other countries of the region and all over the world.

Part 9 of the Military Doctrine stipulates that Turkmenistan will not possess, produce, distribute, or transport across its State territory any nuclear, chemical, biological or other weapons of mass destruction, and that it shall favour political, diplomatic and other non military means of preventing, containing and neutralizing military threats at regional and global levels, and collective action by the international community in addressing threats to peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.

As stated in paragraphs 3 and 4 of article 254 of the Criminal Code of Turkmenistan of 10 May 2010, which establishes criminal liability for smuggling:

> 3. The carriage across the customs border of Turkmenistan of narcotic, psychotropic, toxic, poisonous, radioactive or explosive substances, of weapons, explosive devices, firearms or ammunition, of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction, and of materials and equipment that can be used to develop weapons of mass destruction, whose carriage across the customs border of Turkmenistan is covered by special rules, and also of commodities of strategic importance and cultural properties whose carriage across the customs border of Turkmenistan is covered by special rules, shall, if this act is committed through the bypassing of customs control or concealment of the items from the customs authorities or the fraudulent use of documents or customs identification marks, or involves the failure to make a declaration or the making of a false declaration, be punishable by deprivation of liberty for periods of between three and eight years, with or without the confiscation of property.
>
> 4. The act described in paragraph 3 of the present article, if committed:
>
> (a) Repeatedly;
>
> (b) By a group of persons by prior conspiracy or by an organized group;
>
> (c) By an official taking advantage of his or her official position, or by a person exempt from customs control;
>
> (d) With the use of violence against the person carrying out the customs control,
>
> shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for periods of between five and ten years, with or without the confiscation of property.

As stipulated by article 283 of the Criminal Code of Turkmenistan, which establishes criminal liability for the unlawful handling of radioactive or nuclear materials:

1. The unlawful acquisition, storage, use, transfer, destruction, industrial enrichment, alteration, destruction or dispersal of radioactive or nuclear material shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for a term of up to two years.

2. The same acts, if through negligence they result in human death or other grave consequences, shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for a term of up to five years, with or without the confiscation of property.

Under article 284 of the Criminal Code, which establishes criminal liability for breaching the rules on the handling radioactive or nuclear materials, breaching the rules governing the storage, transfer, use, stocktaking and transport of radioactive or nuclear materials and other rules on their handling, if these actions have damaged the physical protection of radioactive or nuclear materials or caused other serious consequences, shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for terms of between two and seven years, with or without the confiscation of property.

Article 285 of the Criminal Code, which establishes criminal liability for the theft or extortion of radioactive or nuclear materials, stipulates:

1. The theft or extortion of radioactive or nuclear materials shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for terms of between two and seven years, with or without the confiscation of property.

2. The same acts committed:

(a) Repeatedly;

(b) By a group of persons by prior conspiracy;

(c) By a person taking advantage of his or her official position;

(d) With the use or threat of violence that did not endanger life or health,

shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for terms of between three and ten years, with or without the confiscation of property.

3. The theft or extortion of radioactive or nuclear materials, committed with the use or threat of violence that endangered life or health, or by an organized group or criminal association, shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for terms of between six and fifteen years, with or without the confiscation of property.

Note

In the meaning of this article, and also of articles 291 and 294 of this Code, an offence shall be considered to be repeated if it was preceded by the commission of one or more offences covered by these same articles or by articles 227-233 and 271-274 of this Code.

Turkmenistan is a party to the following international instruments:

1. Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Moscow, Washington, D.C., London, 1 July 1968);

2. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (24 September 1996);

3. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (opened for signature on 3 March 1980);

4. Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Vienna, 8 July 2005);

5. Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (8 September 2006, Semipalatinsk);

6. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (13 April 2005, New York).

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Sixty-seventh session
Item 100 of the preliminary list*
Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region

Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region

Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/67/50.

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I. Introduction

1. The General Assembly, in its resolution 66/63, commended the Mediterranean countries for their efforts in meeting common challenges through coordinated overall responses, based on a spirit of multilateral partnership, towards the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchanges and cooperation, guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity, encouraged them to strengthen such efforts through, inter alia, a lasting multilateral and action-oriented cooperative dialogue among States of the region, and recognized the role of the United Nations in promoting regional and international peace and security.

2. The General Assembly recognized that the elimination of the economic and social disparities in levels of development and other obstacles, as well as respect and greater understanding among cultures in the Mediterranean area, would contribute to enhancing peace, security and cooperation among Mediterranean countries through the existing forums.

3. The General Assembly called upon all States of the Mediterranean region that had not yet done so to adhere to all the multilaterally negotiated legal instruments related to the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, thus creating the conditions necessary for strengthening peace and cooperation in the region. The Assembly encouraged all States of the region to favour the necessary conditions for strengthening the confidence-building measures among them by promoting genuine openness and transparency on all military matters, by participating, inter alia, in the United Nations system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures and by providing accurate data and information to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

4. The General Assembly encouraged the Mediterranean countries to strengthen further their cooperation in combating terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including the possible resort by terrorists to weapons of mass destruction, taking into account the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, and in combating international crime and illicit arms transfers and illicit drug production, consumption and trafficking, which pose a serious threat to peace, security and stability in the region and therefore to the improvement of the current political, economic and social situation and which jeopardize friendly relations among States, hinder the development of international cooperation and result in the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the democratic basis of pluralistic society.

5. Furthermore, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit a report on means to strengthen security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region. The present report is submitted in compliance with that request and on the basis of information received from Member States.

6. In this connection, a note verbale dated 14 February 2012 was sent to all Member States requesting their views on the subject. The replies received are contained in section II below. Additional replies will be issued as addenda to the present report.

II. Replies received from Governments

Lebanon

[Original: Arabic]
[26 March 2012]

Lebanon is committed to the resolutions adopted by the United Nations and cooperates in countering terrorism, international crime, arms trafficking and the illicit production and consumption of and traffic in drugs in the Mediterranean area in particular and the world in general.

Netherlands

[Original: English]
[18 June 2012]

At its sixty-sixth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 66/63, entitled "Strengthening of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region".

The following is in response to the request of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs for the view of the Government on the issues covered by the resolution for consideration by the General Assembly at its sixty-seventh session.

The Netherlands, like other European Union member States, believes that European security is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean region. The Netherlands takes its responsibility bilaterally, through the European Union and through other multilateral forums by playing a role in support of the transition processes currently ongoing in various countries in the Mediterranean region.

Security and stability in the Mediterranean region also contributes to the alleviation of tensions beyond the region. The Netherlands calls on all States of the Mediterranean region that have not yet done so, to accede to all multilaterally negotiated, legally binding instruments related to disarmament and non-proliferation, in order to strengthen peace and security.

Panama

[Original: Spanish]
[8 May 2012]

In the light of the complex situation that the countries of the Mediterranean region are currently facing, compounded by the risks and opportunities presented by globalization, it is our view that cooperation is the natural and, indeed, the only way to expand relations among the various States of the region.

The many and varied conflicts that are ongoing in this region have stalled the process of integration and genuine cooperation among its various countries.

Cooperation in security is unquestionably one of the most complex and sensitive areas of cooperation, particularly on account of its political repercussions.

We recommend that the effort to draft truly effective cooperation instruments that will gradually achieve peace and security in the region should continue.

Qatar

[Original: English]
[7 May 2012]

Although the State of Qatar is not located in the geographic area defined in General Assembly resolution 66/63 and is not among the countries mentioned in the resolution, it considers that stability in the Mediterranean basin is of utmost importance in strengthening cooperation with Middle Eastern countries, the Maghreb and other Arab countries. Peace in the Mediterranean goes hand in hand with international stability. Prosperity in the Mediterranean region is the responsibility of all States.

While it reaffirms its commitment to abide by the Charter of the United Nations and the provision of international law related to cooperation among States and friendly relations, the State of Qatar strives continuously to achieve stability, peace and prosperity with the Mediterranean countries.

In reference to paragraph 7 of the aforementioned resolution, the State of Qatar took several measures in the field of combating terrorism by joining the international mechanisms on disarmament and non-proliferation, and promulgated national legislation to implement them. The State of Qatar bans the use of weapons of mass destruction on its soil, and works with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Arab countries and the international community towards combating international crime and the illicit transfer of arms.

The national committee on arms embargo organizes workshops in order to raise awareness among high school and university students, as well as customs employees. These workshops are intended to inform Qatari society about the danger posed by weapons of mass destruction and have a positive effect on the development of society and in ensuring human rights and fundamental freedoms. Similarly, the State of Qatar strives to promote international cooperation, which contributes to enhancing peace and security among the countries of the region, those of the Mediterranean and the rest of the world.

Spain

[Original: Spanish]
[11 June 2012]

For historical and geographical reasons, the Mediterranean region has always been a priority for Spain in all respects. The latest National Defence Directive, No. 1/2008 of 30 December 2008, states that "the security of Spain is also tied to the security of the Mediterranean region: it is therefore crucial that the Mediterranean become an area of peace, stability and shared prosperity". The Mediterranean region therefore requires a framework for ongoing action and decision-making with regard to the development of a defence policy at this time of extraordinary intensity.

The Spanish defence policy for the Mediterranean region is in line with the general action strategy and guidelines for the current Spanish defence policy:

It complies rigorously with international law;

It is a policy with a strong multilateral focus that was developed within the framework of various initiatives and organizations with which Spain is involved: the Mediterranean Dialogue within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the activities carried out with the members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; and the Five plus Five initiative, in which Spain, together with nine other countries from both sides of the Mediterranean, participates. In all these multilateral forums, Spain has consistently demonstrated an active and highly committed policy in terms of its respective roles in the Mediterranean;

In addition to this multilateral focus, Spain supports all security and defence initiatives that facilitate dialogue and promote bilateral cooperation among countries in the Mediterranean region, especially through defence diplomacy.

This is a policy that reflects a high level of commitment, as our presence in the eastern Mediterranean testifies. In Lebanon, as part of the complex mission of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, some 1,000 Spanish troops are working for global stability in a specific area with many implications not only for the surrounding Middle East region but also for the entire world.

The Spanish defence policy seeks to build trust through cooperation, proposes lines of action and objectives for the international community and plays a role in conflict resolution. This responsibility is not shouldered solely by a single ministry but rather is carried out through a multidisciplinary approach and coordinated action by all the relevant public agencies, coupled with the combined efforts of civilian and military instruments and public and private entities.

The failure to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the primary causes of instability in the Mediterranean and constitutes a serious obstacle for cooperation in that region. It is therefore a priority of Spain in its activities abroad to promote a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, on the basis of the international community's consensus on the urgent need to adopt and implement without delay the solution of two States, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security. Spain believes that such a solution must be accompanied by the forging of peace between Israel and its other Arab neighbours and of a new relationship between Israelis and the Arab and Muslim world. Working together with other members of the European Union and of the Quartet,[1] as well as the Arab States, Spain will spare no effort in striving towards that objective. It is crucial to bring about the resumption of the political process between the parties, thus helping to build mutual trust, and to avoid a crisis or anything that could reverse the progress made thus far, such as settlement expansion or further outbreaks of violence in Gaza. Spain will continue to support a solution based on international law and the mutual agreement of both parties.

However, it cannot be denied that the Mediterranean is a region of highly complex and diverse social, religious, economic and value systems; therefore, the

[1] The members of the Middle East Quartet are the Russian Federation, the United States of America, the European Union and the United Nations.

greatest challenge is finding and developing strategies that foster integration and cooperation.

There are, moreover, significant differences in perceptions, including with regard to security and defence. The establishment of a system of measures to foster trust and security among the Mediterranean countries could thus prove crucial. A system of demonstrated effectiveness, such as that which already exists within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, could be a good starting point if adapted to the Mediterranean context.

The system could be based on a Mediterranean security map in which the geographical region of the Mediterranean would be considered an integral security area, and would include a series of measures to foster trust and security, a code of good conduct for Mediterranean countries and a mechanism for exchanging information which would allow Mediterranean countries to better coordinate their individual security agendas.

The measures to be promoted in order to foster mutual trust and thus strengthen security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region include the following:

- Increased cooperation to meet global security challenges: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, organized crime, mass population movements and drug trafficking;
- Establishment of mechanisms for consultation and exchange of military information;
- Cooperation in establishing mechanisms for conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation;
- Promotion of the signing and ratification of international treaties and agreements on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, and upholding of their objectives;
- Promotion of the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery;
- Strengthening of cooperation and integration among Mediterranean countries and furthering of their contribution to peacekeeping operations, especially those linked to the Mediterranean region;
- Reinforcement of cooperation and assistance programmes in the area of security and defence, and promotion of the exchange of military units and observers in exercises, training, visits to military units or meetings among General Staff;
- Expansion and strengthening of mechanisms for the provision of armed forces support to civilian authorities in the event of an emergency or disaster;
- Continuation of the efforts of the Five plus Five group (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia plus France, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain). The Ministerial Declaration of Cagliari of 10 December 2008 marked the official launching of the Five plus Five virtual defence college established to address common security and defence issues in the 10 partner countries and to improve mutual awareness on the part of the countries on the two shores of

the Western Mediterranean, as well as to facilitate the exchange of experience and networking among the participants. The activities of the Five plus Five framework are shared among the member countries each year on a voluntary basis. In 2011, meetings were held in Paris, in March, and in Rome, in September;

Strengthening of cooperation programmes on maritime security and the control of maritime traffic;

Continuation of the international seminars on security and defence in the Mediterranean, which have been held annually in Barcelona since 2002, with a view to contributing to the political and academic debate on security and defence in the Mediterranean. In 2011, the seminar was held in Barcelona on 13 June and focused on armed forces and democratic transitions in the Mediterranean;

Promotion of activities that lead to greater transparency in defence planning and in national budget control processes;

Promotion of activities to foster democratic oversight of national defence and national security forces.

Turkey

[Original: English]
[30 May 2012]

The Mediterranean area has always been a sensitive and complex geopolitical and economic mosaic. The security environment and cooperative mechanisms in the Mediterranean have been in a state of flux since the end of the cold war. Nevertheless, the complexity of the political, economic and security environment has increased recently, necessitating a more incisive analysis of the challenges faced in the area and potential cooperative mechanisms to deal with these challenges.

Turkey believes that the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular are at the core of the problems in the Middle East. Finding a just, lasting and comprehensive solution to this conflict would be the key to the normalization of intraregional relations, opening new horizons for full regional cooperation and development in the Mediterranean basin.

The Middle East and North Africa have embarked upon a historic process of political change and transformation. This process needs to be accomplished in an orderly and peaceful manner in accordance with the legitimate demands of the peoples of the region for the establishment of an atmosphere of peace, stability and security as well as effective regional cooperation in the whole Mediterranean basin. Fundamental changes taking place in the Middle East and North Africa region in recent times have made the need for the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more important and urgent than ever. Thus, Turkey has continued to welcome and support all efforts for the resumption of direct negotiations for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through a two-State solution that would lead to the establishment of an independent, sovereign and viable Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital, enabling its people to live in peace and security with the State of Israel, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations.

Turkey desires to see all countries in the region share the goals of non-proliferation and to collectively work towards a safer and more stable world. Turkey supports the establishment of an effectively verifiable zone, free of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the Middle East and encourages all efforts for developing a common regional understanding on this project, with the participation of all parties concerned. In this context, Turkey's support in general for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and more specifically for the implementation of Security Council resolution 984 (1995), regarding nuclear weapons, will continue. Turkey worked actively towards the final document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which includes the convening of a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. We are prepared to contribute to the efforts of the facilitator for the successful convening of this event.

Turkey strongly supports international and regional cooperation against terrorism, organized crime and illicit trafficking. At the initiative of Turkey, Operation Mediterranean Shield has been conducted since 1 April 2006 in order to secure the strategic oil transportation from Ceyhan terminal in the East Mediterranean as well as to deter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other illegal activities associated with terrorism. Units assigned to the operation are also involved with the interrogation of trade vessels in the area of surveillance. The contacts identified within the scope of these operations are forwarded to authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as well as to those elements taking part in Operation Active Endeavour and the maritime operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

In conformity with the Maritime Traffic Regulations for the Turkish Straits and the Marmara Region, all vessels carrying weapons and ammunition intending to pass through the Turkish Straits are requested to provide "end-user certificates" in order to determine whether the shipment is legal and compatible with relevant international obligations. The same practice also applies for air transportation. As indicated in the Aeronautical Information Publication of Turkey, all cargo flights carrying dangerous goods are requested to provide "end-user certificates" in order to obtain overflight and/or landing/take-off permissions in Turkish airspace.

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Sixty-seventh session
Item 95 (dd) of the preliminary list*
General and complete disarmament

Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/67/50.

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I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 66/50, entitled "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction", the General Assembly urged all Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures already taken by international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and to seek the views of Member States on additional relevant measures, including national measures, for tackling the global threat posed by the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction, and to report to the Assembly at its sixty-seventh session. The present report is submitted in response to that request.

2. By a note verbale dated 13 February 2012, Member States were invited to inform the Secretary-General of the measures taken, and to communicate their views on the issue. On 21 February 2012, letters were also dispatched to relevant international organizations, including relevant bodies and agencies of the United Nations, inviting them to provide executive summaries of their contributions for inclusion in the report of the Secretary-General, while their submissions, in extenso, are posted on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs if so requested by the invited organization prior to the issuance of the report in question as a document of the United Nations. Organizations that had reported their relevant activities in 2011 were invited to submit only new information in relation to what they had previously submitted.

3. As at 9 July 2012, replies had been received from Colombia, Georgia, Lebanon and Norway, which are reproduced or summarized in section II of the present report. A reply from the European Union has been received and is reproduced in section III, in accordance with modalities set out in resolution 65/276. Replies were also received from 12 international organizations and are summarized in section IV of the present report.

II. Replies received from Member States

Colombia

[Original: English]
[14 May 2012]

The Republic of Colombia, guided by its foreign policy of complete and general disarmament, abstains from providing support to non-State actors that try to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use biological, nuclear or chemical weapons and their vector systems.

Consequently, Colombia is a State party to the main international legal instruments in the matter of disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Colombia is also a State party to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Tlatelolco Treaty), as well as to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Testing in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, and has ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Furthermore, regarding nuclear security matters, Colombia is a State party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident; and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiologic Emergency.

The Republic of Colombia submitted its national report on measures adopted to implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on two occasions: the first report was submitted in February 2005 and the second in December 2011.

Consequently, Colombia has twice requested the cooperation of the Committee established under resolution 1540 (2004) to effectively respond to the challenge that terrorists represent with weapons of mass destruction under their power.

The Republic of Colombia voted in favour of two resolutions in 2010 and in 2011 that were submitted under the General Assembly agenda item on "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction".

Georgia*

[Original: English]
[29 March 2012]

Georgia is a party to all of the 13 anti-terrorism international conventions, as well as the Council of Europe Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism and its amending Protocol. The provisions of the conventions mentioned have already been implemented in the Georgian legislation, namely, all terrorism-related crimes under the above-mentioned conventions were criminalized as such in the Criminal Code of Georgia.

Within the frameworks of universal (United Nations conventions), regional (Council of Europe conventions), subregional (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova (GUAM), Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)) and bilateral international instruments (with Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Egypt, Estonia, France, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America and Uzbekistan) or on the basis of reciprocity, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia closely cooperates with the respective agencies of partner countries to tackle international terrorism.

Since the Rose Revolution, the Government of Georgia has declared the fight against organized crime in all its manifestations as one of the top priorities for the country. The Government of Georgia adopted a coherent, coordinated and wide-ranging strategy for the fight against organized crime and terrorism. The adoption of the Law of Georgia on Combating Terrorism, the Law of Georgia on Organized Crime and Racketeering, the new Criminal Procedural Code and relevant changes to the Criminal Code has served as an effective legal ground for the prevention of and combating organized crime and terrorism.

* The full text of the information provided by the Government of Georgia is available from the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/SGReport_Terrorism/SG_Report.shtml). An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia is entrusted with responsibilities for combating crime generally. It created a special Counter-Terrorist Centre, which is responsible for conducting operative activities for the prevention of terrorism and the investigation of terrorism cases. It exchanges information with other countries and is also closely linked with other relevant institutions in Georgia for the exchange of information. The officers of the Counter-Terrorist Centre are well equipped and trained with the help of partner countries and international organizations to tackle any manifestation of terrorism-related crimes.

With the assistance of the United States Government, new equipment on border crossing points has been installed, which enhanced the capacities of Georgian law enforcement agencies to reveal trafficking of radioactive and toxic material that might be used for terrorist aims. In addition, security has been enhanced at the border crossing points to limit illegal crossings of the Georgian border and to prevent the flow of criminals, including terrorists, into the territory of Georgia.

Lebanon

[Original: Arabic]
[26 March 2012]

Lebanon possesses no weapons of mass destruction and is in compliance with United Nations resolutions prohibiting the use or acquisition of such weapons by terrorists.

Lebanon has introduced laws and regulations that allow for the monitoring of the export, transit and cross-border movement of weapons of all kinds, prohibit trafficking in such weapons and provide for the prosecution of any terrorists, the harbouring of whom is forbidden under Lebanese law.

Lebanon supports closer cooperation between States and has contributed to counter-terrorism efforts. It has put in place strict deterrent legislation concerning the surveillance and prosecution of terrorists.

Lebanon is combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and is also working to curb armament, with a view to establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. Moreover, Lebanon denies the legitimacy of the threat or use of such weapons.

Lebanon condemns all forms of terrorism and participates in concerted and collective international counter-terrorism efforts.

Lebanon expresses grave concern at Israel's non-compliance with international legitimacy, which poses a threat to all countries in the region.

Norway

[Original: English]
[1 June 2012]

The spread of weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups is a fundamental threat to international peace and security. All countries must deal with the serious

danger of nuclear terrorism. It is a national responsibility to establish necessary legislation and safeguards for nuclear security. It is our collective responsibility to provide the necessary international framework to ensure the safe handling of nuclear material, and to prevent such materials from falling into the wrong hands. Hence, Norway fully supports the strengthening of relevant multilateral and legally binding instruments in order to tackle the threat posed by the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction.

Norway is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. Universal adherence and compliance to these vital instruments and their control mechanisms provide a fundamental bulwark against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups. Norway calls for full universalization and full compliance with the obligations set by these treaties.

Norway welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) entitled "Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction", and supports its full implementation.

Norway attaches great importance to the full implementation of relevant International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) instruments on nuclear security and safety. Norway has provided $5 million to the establishment of the IAEA fuel bank. Norway has also provided NOK 20 million (equivalent to $3.6 million) for the IAEA extrabudgetary programme for strengthening nuclear safety in developing countries. Norway announced at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit that it would provide NOK 20 million (equivalent to $3.6 million) for the IAEA efforts to increase security at nuclear facilities in developing countries. At the Nuclear Security Summit in 2012, Norway announced an increased contribution to the Nuclear Security Fund by an additional NOK 8 million (equivalent to €1 million) to nuclear security projects in developing countries.

Norway supports IAEA assistance programmes and cooperation with developing countries on highly enriched uranium minimization, and, together with Austria and the Nuclear Threat Initiative and in cooperation with IAEA, hosted the 2nd International Symposium on HEU Minimization in Vienna, from 23 to 25 January 2012.

Since 1992 Norway has provided approximately NOK 1.7 billion (equivalent to $290 million) for nuclear safety and security in the north-western Russian Federation, the latest of which was an additional contribution of NOK 20 million (equivalent to $3.6 million) to the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership in 2011.

Norway has worked in partnership with the Governments of Kazakhstan and the United States on securing borders in Central Asia to prevent and detect nuclear smuggling.

Norway has signed and ratified the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities; adopted the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, including its supplementary guidance document.

Norway has signed the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, completed the legislative groundwork necessary for prompt ratification and intends to complete the ratification process this year.

Norway has signed The Hague Code of Conduct against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles, and the Proliferation Security Initiative. Norway participates in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, as well as other international bodies such as INTERPOL, to exchange experiences and knowledge.

Norway underlines the need for effective export controls in denying terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. Norway plays an active role in different export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group. Norway encourages all States Members of the United Nations to follow the guidelines and recommendations of these regimes.

III. Reply received from the European Union

[Original: English]
[31 May 2012]

The European Union (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as the 2003 European Security Strategy and EU Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategy, the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005) and the New lines for action in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems (2008), all together reinforce the EU commitment to prevent the access of terrorists to nuclear, chemical and biological materials. In line with resolution 1540 (2004) of the Security Council and its Weapons of Mass Destruction Strategy, the EU requires the insertion of non-proliferation clauses in all its agreements with third countries. The accession of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) to the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials was approved by the European Council in 2007, and ratification is expected to be completed soon by all EU member States and Euratom.

The EU has actively contributed to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, and is committed to its objectives, including with regard to securing nuclear material and radioactive sources and to strengthening information security in order to prevent terrorists from obtaining information, technology or expertise needed to acquire or use nuclear materials for malicious purposes. Equally, the EU contributed actively to the outcome of the Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons Review Conference held in December 2011 in Geneva. As for chemical weapons, the EU accounts for 40 per cent of the budget of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons spent on disarmament and non-proliferation projects worldwide. Particularly important in recent months were the contributions by the EU to provide assistance to countries in order to reinforce their national capacities and ensure full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The EU contributes actively to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and attaches utmost importance to the areas of nuclear detection and response mechanisms, including nuclear forensics.

The EU has been continuously implementing its 2009 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Action Plan, which, inter alia, contributes to the

implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The European Union Police Office (EUROPOL) conducts several activities that are aimed at assisting EU member States with developing their capacity to prevent and respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents. Under the Seventh Framework Programme for Security Research (2007-2013) of the European Commission, a part of the funding is allocated to research and development projects in the field of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security.

The Border Monitoring Working Group, created in 2006 between the United States, the EU and IAEA, has been working on the implementation of joint projects in which united efforts are undertaken in the specific area of nuclear forensics, aiming at effectively combating illicit nuclear trafficking, terrorism and proliferation.

IV. Information received from international organizations

A. United Nations system

International Atomic Energy Agency

[Original: English]
[2 July 2012]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continued to assist States through the implementation of the Nuclear Security Plan 2010-2013.

In order to provide advice to States on how to establish and maintain national nuclear security regimes, IAEA published three documents in the Nuclear Security Series, namely, Nuclear Security Recommendations: on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities; on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities; and on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials Out of Regulatory Control.

Nuclear security peer reviews and advisory services continued to be the main tools of IAEA for helping States to assess their nuclear security effectiveness, identify needs, and provide a basis for formulating plans for continuous improvement. Three International Physical Protection Advisory Service missions were undertaken and 14 other advisory missions were conducted, focusing on legal, regulatory and practical measures for controlling nuclear and other radioactive material.

A major element of IAEA nuclear security assistance is the provision of equipment for detecting and responding to the unauthorized movement of nuclear and other radioactive material. Four remote monitoring systems were deployed in four facilities to secure Category I-III radioactive sources. The Agency also donated 256 handheld monitors to member States and lent an additional 588 radiation detection instruments.

IAEA conducted 52 training events covering all aspects of nuclear security, reaching more than 1,300 people from 120 States. The International Nuclear Security Education Network, established in 2010, has expanded and now comprises over 50 academic institutions.

The membership of the Agency's Illicit Trafficking Database has continued to expand, with two States joining in 2011, bringing the total number of participating States to 112 member States and 1 non-member State. A total of 147 incidents were reported in 2011.

IAEA continued to work with relevant international and regional organizations and institutions. IAEA engaged member States and relevant United Nations bodies such as the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the Committee of the Security Council established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to establish a basis to improve cooperation and enhance dialogue among other international nuclear security-related initiatives. In order to promote this process, IAEA organized the first Information Exchange Meeting, in May 2011, which was attended by 21 representatives of 8 international organizations and initiatives.

International Civil Aviation Organization

[Original: English]
[31 May 2012]

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) promotes the counter-terrorism objectives laid down in General Assembly resolution 66/50 "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction" through a number of key initiatives and activities. With the collaboration of member States, partner organizations and the civil aviation industry, ICAO plays an essential leadership role in protecting the air transport system primarily by setting international security-related Standards and Recommended Practices designed to prevent acts of unlawful interference against civil aviation, auditing compliance and providing assistance to States to enhance their aviation security systems and measures.

ICAO recognizes the strong links between efforts to secure the global air cargo supply chain and measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons, commonly grouped as weapons of mass destruction. In the wake of the October 2010 incidents in which two improvised explosive devices concealed in air cargo were transported between several continents on a number of different flights via multiple legs, ICAO has intensified its air cargo security initiatives with a view to reinforcing the global air cargo security framework in order to counter this type of threat.

While ICAO has had a long history in the leadership of aviation terrorism prevention strategies, mainly to deal with the introduction of explosive devices on board aircraft, and hijacking, the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons represents a different set of challenges from traditional threats. Consequently, the possible use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats was the subject of discussion at the meeting of the ICAO Aviation Security Panel in March 2012.

In partnership with all aviation stakeholders that participate in the ICAO Aviation Security Panel, ICAO is making continuous progress in enhancing the global air cargo security regime as called for in the Declaration on Aviation Security, which was unanimously adopted at the 37th session of the ICAO Assembly. Furthermore, it is envisaged that the High-level Conference on Aviation Security, to be held in Montreal from 12 to 14 September 2012, will consider and is

expected to endorse an Action Plan on Air Cargo Security in order to further strengthen the international supply chain.

The 2010 Beijing Convention, adopted under the auspices of ICAO, which modernizes the ICAO counter-terrorism international convention legal framework, contains provisions relating to the criminalization of the acts of using against or on board an aircraft in service any biological, chemical or nuclear weapon or explosive. It also contains a provision that criminalizes the transport without lawful authorization of explosive or radioactive material, biological, chemical or nuclear weapon and equipment (hardware or software) that may contribute to the design or manufacture of a biological, chemical or nuclear weapon. It is generally considered that these new provisions reinforce the non-proliferation international legal framework in place.

International Maritime Organization

[Original: English]
[5 June 2012]

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted, in 2002, mandatory measures to enhance maritime security, as the new chapter XI-2 to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended, and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code.

These measures, which became effective on 1 July 2004, are implemented by 161 member States, representing 99 per cent of the world's merchant fleet. About 40,000 ships engaged in international voyages and more than 10,000 port facilities serving them have had their security plans developed and approved. Further to the adoption of amendments to chapter V of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea in 2006, IMO is currently also implementing a mandatory Long-Range Tracking and Identification system to permit the tracking of ships globally.

The 2005 Protocols to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Navigation, and its Protocol relating to the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, respectively, which entered into force on 28 July 2010, have extended the scope of the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Navigation instruments to cover new offences, such as using the ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury, and the unlawful carriage of weapons or material that could be used for weapons of mass destruction. New boarding provisions for suspect ships have also been included.

As at 31 May 2012, the 2005 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Navigation Protocols had been ratified or acceded to by 22 States and 18 States, respectively. IMO continues to provide advice and assistance to member States and international organizations on all aspects of maritime security, including terrorist acts against ships, offshore installations and other maritime interests.

IMO also maintains a vibrant technical cooperation programme, assisting Safety of Life at Sea Contracting Governments to meet their obligations with respect to maritime security, through training courses, needs assessment missions, seminars and workshops on regional and national bases; and providing information and advice at relevant conferences and meetings on maritime security.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime*

[Original: English]
[29 May 2012]

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Terrorism Prevention Branch has continued to assist countries in implementing the international legal instruments related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism, in accordance with its relevant General Assembly mandates.

The Terrorism Prevention Branch conducted and participated in several relevant regional activities including: a joint OSCE workshop on the 2005 legal instruments related to terrorism for OSCE member States, in April 2010 in Austria; a workshop on chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism and maritime terrorism, held in November 2010 in Barbados; a regional facilitation event for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) for Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica and Peru, in November 2010 in Lima, co-organized by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), and the Office for Disarmament Affairs. The Terrorism Prevention Branch United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime also held national workshops, in Egypt in February 2010 and in Indonesia in October 2010.

The Terrorism Prevention Branch is a member of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) Working Group on weapons of mass destruction and has contributed to its ongoing work as well as to its report on prevention, response and mitigation of terrorist attacks using nuclear or radiological weapons or materials, launched in 2010.

In December 2010, the Terrorism Prevention Branch participated in a meeting, held in Austria, of international, regional and subregional organizations on cooperation in promoting the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

The Terrorism Prevention Branch also participated in the tabletop exercise on the preparedness of State parties to prevent terrorist attacks involving chemicals, organized by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, in November 2010 in Poland.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is an official observer to the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and participated in its meetings, in January 2010 in Hungary; in June 2010 in United Arab Emirates; and in November 2010 in Ukraine.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime co-sponsored the elaboration of the IAEA Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime also participated and contributed to several initiatives and meetings of IAEA including: a Workshop on Implementing Legislation in Nuclear Security for some Asian countries, held in Vienna in April 2010; an International Nuclear Security

* The full text of the information provided by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/SGReport_Terrorism/SG_Report.shtml). An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.

Educational Network, an event on Facilitating Adherence to the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials in November 2010.

The Terrorism Prevention Branch has developed a range of specialized tools, including electronic and substantive publications that aim to enhance understanding of the international legal regime against terrorism, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism.

World Health Organization*

[Original: English]
[15 June 2012]

In compliance with General Assembly resolutions on the control and limitation of documentation prepared by the Secretariat as well as the guidelines of the Secretary-General for reports drafted and/or compiled by the Secretariat, the submission received from the World Health Organization could not be included in the present report. The full text of the information received is available from www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/SGReport_Terrorism/SG_Report.shtml.

B. Other international organizations

African Union

[Original: English]
[26 March 2012]

The African Union continues to be actively engaged in promoting the ratification and implementation of the regional and universal weapons of mass destruction disarmament and non-proliferation regime, as well as the international nuclear security regime, and remains committed to supporting member States compliance with their regional and international obligations aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. In this regard, the African Union works closely with the international bodies and entities responsible for administering this regime.

In 2004, the African Union adopted a Protocol to the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which incorporates member States obligations under Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004). In 2011, the African Union developed a model law to further assist member States in enacting legislation covering the various aspects and manifestations of the crime of terrorism and to implement the provisions contained in the continental and international instruments, including the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

The African Commission on Nuclear Energy, established by the African Nuclear Weapons-Free-Zone Treaty, which entered into force in July 2009, will play a key role in promoting and ensuring the safe and secure use of nuclear and radiological material in the continent. The continent has also established a number of forums that devote attention to nuclear safety and security, including the Forum for Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa and the African Regional Cooperative

Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Science and Technology. Consultations between the European Union and African Union member States are currently under way for the establishment of Centres of Excellence for Chemical, Biological, Radiological And Nuclear risk mitigation.

While the continent is strongly committed to the universal weapons of mass destruction disarmament, non-proliferation and security regime, States continue to face a number of challenges in implementing their obligations, including competing security and developmental priorities, lack of resources and expertise and the fact that some of the instruments are not specifically applicable to many of the States.

While the African Union welcomes the support provided by international partners, there is a need for effective coordination among the partners. Support provided to African Union member States should also be tailored to, and in accordance with assessed needs. In addition, support provided should equally contribute to the continent's development needs, through boosting support for peaceful applications of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear sciences and technologies in the field of human health, agriculture and industries.

Commonwealth of Independent States

[Original: Russian]
[21 March 2012]

In response to your letter dated 21 February 2012, we wish to communicate the following.

In accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations General Assembly, for the purposes of implementing General Assembly resolutions 66/50 (2011), 65/62 (2010) and Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and remaining mindful of the threat posed by the use of weapons of mass destruction for terrorist purposes, the States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States are taking additional measures to prevent the use of such weapons by terrorists.

The legal basis underpinning cooperation between the States members of the Commonwealth and their competent authorities in measures to combat terrorism is the Programme for the period 2011-2013 ratified by decision of the Council of Heads of State of 10 December 2010, which provides for the adoption and implementation of measures:

- To suppress the illicit manufacture of and trafficking in potent chemical, biological and radioactive substances;
- To protect facilities which pose an elevated technological and environmental hazard;
- To identify and shut down specialized laboratories and other facilities used by terrorist and extremist organizations to prepare the instruments of their criminal activity, including the components of weapons of mass destruction.

The States members of the Commonwealth accord great importance to the special training of anti-terrorist forces and to the preparation of resources that can be used in real life situations to suppress criminal activities involving the use of weapons of mass destruction.

In 2011, the Anti-Terrorist Centre of the States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, acting in concert with the Commonwealth's sectoral cooperation bodies, set up a management team of the heads of the counter-terrorism units of the different States members and prepared a joint command post exercise called "Berkut — Antiterror — 2011", conducted in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, and a management team of the heads of the counter-terrorism security forces and intelligence services of the States members of the Commonwealth and prepared a joint counter-terrorism training exercise called "Donbass — Antiterror — 2011", in Donetsk, Ukraine.

One positive outcome of the joint activities run by the law enforcement agencies of Commonwealth countries is the regular staging of special integrated operations to counter terrorism, the illicit trafficking in narcotics, weapons, ammunition and explosives and illegal migration and to suppress the smuggling of natural resources.

At the present time, inter-State consultations are under way between the States members of the Commonwealth on draft agreements on the training of counter-terrorism specialists in the educational establishments of the security agencies, special services and law enforcement authorities of the States members of the Commonwealth and on cooperation in providing logistical support to the authorities responsible for countering terrorism.

Work is also continuing on the development of computerized databases of potentially fraudulent line items which can be used for the detection and tracking of cross-border offences and for the apprehension of persons on inter State wanted lists.

No information is available about evidence of the production or acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction and their components, or of their access to production technologies within the territory of the Commonwealth.

Financial Action Task Force

[Original: English]
[20 March 2012]

The Financial Action Task Force is an intergovernmental policymaking body which is focused on developing and encouraging implementation policies on anti-money-laundering and combating the financing of terrorism. The Financial Action Task Force mandate was expanded in 2008 to include the financing of proliferation, based on the proven expertise of the Task Force in addressing illicit financial activity through the global financial system, and the value that the Financial Action Task Force could add to the wider efforts of the international community. Its main activities are: setting international standards; assessing compliance with those standards; studying methods and trends of illicit financial activity; and identifying and responding to threats to the integrity of the global financial system. The Financial Action Task Force is comprised of 34 member jurisdictions and 2 regional organizations, and leads a global network of 8 Financial Action Task Force-style regional bodies, which together cover more than 180 jurisdictions — all of which have committed at the Ministerial level to implementing the standards of the Financial Action Task Force.

In February 2012, the Financial Action Task Force issued new standards, *The FATF Recommendations*, to combat the financing of proliferation, and assist countries in their implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions.

The work of anti-money-laundering/counter-terrorist financing authorities, including the analysis of suspicious transaction reports by financial intelligence units, may usefully support the investigation of proliferation activity or related violations of export controls. Financial Action Task Force Recommendation 2 requires countries to have effective mechanisms which enable their anti-money-laundering/counter-terrorist financing authorities and authorities responsible for combating proliferation to cooperate and coordinate domestically, at the policy and operational levels. The Financial Action Task Force has also issued related guidance in this area: *Best Practices Paper on Recommendation 2: sharing among domestic competent authorities information related to the financing of proliferation*. This new standard and guidance will assist jurisdictions to implement the financial provisions of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and related resolutions.

The application of targeted financial sanctions (freezing actions and financial prohibitions) is another tool for combating proliferation. Although not identical, the application of targeted financial sanctions in the proliferation context bears many similarities to the application of such sanctions in the terrorist financing context. Financial Action Task Force Recommendation 7 will assist jurisdictions in their implementation of targeted financial sanctions against persons or entities designated by (or under the authority of) the Security Council, pursuant to its resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1737 (2006), and their successor resolutions.

INTERPOL

[Original: English]
[24 May 2012]

INTERPOL is the only truly international police organization in the world and comprises 190 member States. Within its structure is the Public Safety and Terrorism Sub-Directorate, of which the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives Terrorism Prevention programme forms a key part. The work of the programme is primarily to counter the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives terrorist threat and consists of three main pillars: intelligence analysis for police services; programmes to prevent the illegal dispersal of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and Explosives materials; responding to and investigating chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives threats and malicious incidents. This is achieved through conducting threat assessments and analysis; working to increase the level of awareness of all national law enforcement agencies; delivering training sessions in order to increase law enforcement capabilities; and providing prevention methodologies for use by member countries.

Owing to the complex nature of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives prevention and response, a multidisciplinary approach is essential. This needs to be coordinated at a governmental level, ensuring close cooperation and information exchange between the various ministries, agencies and institutions involved. This includes those specialized in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives materials regulation and security, as well as public health

and the wider law enforcement community. It is important that this inter-agency approach be extended to an international level. INTERPOL operates on the global stage, connecting its worldwide network of member countries through its 365/24/7 Command and Coordination Centre, its I-24/7 Global Police Communications System, its National Central Bureaux, and through maintaining close and effective working partnerships with other international governmental and non-governmental agencies that are specialized in the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives field, for example, WHO, EUROPOL, IAEA and the United Nations.

These agencies work with INTERPOL to provide expert training in the specialist areas of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives, e.g., WHO support to the Bio-Terrorism training programme from 2005 to 2011; and IAEA collaboration with INTERPOL in the development of guidance documents and manuals (e.g., the IAEA Guide for Radiological Crime Scene Management). Another area of joint working is the INTERPOL Project Geiger. This is a United States Federal Bureau of Investigation-funded project that has enabled INTERPOL, in partnership with IAEA, to create a specialized database, which gathers comprehensive data on the illicit trafficking of radioactive and nuclear materials, analyses the threats and assists with international investigations. This database currently has in excess of 2,500 cases relating to the smuggling of radioactive or nuclear material.

It is examples such as these of the effective working of INTERPOL with its international partners that provide the foundation upon which INTERPOL has built its expertise in countering the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives terrorist threat.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization*

[Original: English]
[7 May 2012]

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

- NATO places a high priority on preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and defending against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats and hazards and the Alliance will work actively to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by State and non-State actors. At the 2010 Lisbon Summit, Heads of State and Government of members of NATO called for universal adherence to, and compliance with, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the additional protocol to the IAEA Safeguard Agreement, and called for full implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Counter-terrorism is also a key priority for NATO. The 2010 Strategic Concept identifies terrorism as a direct threat and reaffirms the Alliance's determination to ensure that NATO has the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety of its populations and security of its territories.

* The full text of the information provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is available from the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/SGReport_Terrorism/SG_Report.shtml). An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.

- Operation Active Endeavour is a NATO maritime operation that contributes to the fight against terrorism by patrolling the Mediterranean Sea and monitoring shipping to help detect, deter and protect against terrorist activity.

Cooperation with partners

- Through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, the NATO-Russia Council, and with other partners across the globe, NATO has deepened cooperation and information-sharing on weapons of mass destruction threats and strengthened non-proliferation initiatives. For instance, the Annual NATO Conference on Weapons of Mass Destruction Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation is one of the largest outreach activities of NATO. It gathers decision-makers, senior officials and distinguished academics in the field of weapons of mass destruction and security from a wide range of countries and enables them to openly exchange views. On average, 150 participants from more than 50 countries attend this event every year.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear defence capabilities

- NATO and NATO Allies have significantly improved and are further improving the Alliance's chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence activities. Within the NATO Response Force, the multinational Combined Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defence Task Force, including the Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Joint Assessment Team, is the key asset to protect from, and respond to, an attack or event involving chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials.

Science cooperation

- NATO supports security-related civil science and technology collaboration between scientists and experts from NATO and partner countries, particularly under NATO's Science for Peace and Security programme. Between 2006 and 2012, 100 activities (multi-year projects, workshops and training courses) were completed under this programme in a range of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear-related areas. There are also 13 ongoing multi-year projects in these areas.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

[Original: English]
[28 June 2012]

In 2011, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) actively contributed to the international efforts in preventing non-State actors (including terrorists) from acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction and related activities. Furthermore, OSCE continued to focus on strengthening the international legal framework in countering terrorism and reinvigorated its supportive work on promoting enhanced container and supply chain security.

Promoting implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)

OSCE has been mandated by the 2011 Vilnius Ministerial Council Decision to identify and strengthen the specific forms of the organization's contribution to assist participating States in the further implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). In line with this decision, OSCE has established a national network of Points of Contact on the resolution and has shared it with the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).

In its resolution 1977 (2011), the Security Council recognized the need to enhance coordination of efforts at the national, regional, subregional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to the serious challenge and threat to international peace and security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As the largest regional security organization, OSCE therefore can and already has been of instrumental importance in assisting the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) in promoting comprehensive implementation of the resolution, while at the same time delivering concrete outcomes, such as improved coordination and partnership of international and regional organizations, and national action plans of a number of participating States.

More concretely, OSCE and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs closely cooperate and coordinate their efforts in order to assist OSCE participating States in the development of their legislative framework and technical capabilities. In October 2011, a memorandum of understanding was signed in order to delineate the role of each organization and to establish a non-exclusive framework for technical cooperation with a view to further enhancing international efforts for reducing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the potential for non-State actors to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use these weapons and their means of delivery.

Promoting the international legal framework to combat nuclear terrorism

The Transnational Threats Department of OSCE has contributed to strengthening the international efforts to prevent terrorism financing and therewith also impacted on terrorist organizations' access to funds to acquire explosives and weapons of mass destruction. The Transnational Threats Department has organized workshops and training in the prevention of terrorism financing. In addition, the Transnational Threats Action against Terrorism Unit has contributed to raising awareness of the need to strengthen control of explosive substances, a commitment of all States that are parties to the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 1997.

Promoting container and supply chain security

The Transnational Threats Action against Terrorism Unit continued its supportive work on promoting enhanced container and supply chain security, an area particularly relevant in terms of preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction through illicit trafficking and potentially abusing international supply chains as a means of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear delivery.

World Customs Organization

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The World Customs Organization (WCO) is an intergovernmental organization with 177 members, whose customs services process approximately 98 per cent of international trade. As the "first line of defence" at the border, WCO supports the development and implementation of appropriate border control and law enforcement measures to detect, deter, prevent and combat the illicit cross-border movement of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery. Close cooperation with the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) is therefore fundamental.

In the context of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), WCO has consequently initiated or supported the following activities:

- The WCO SAFE Framework of Standards to secure and facilitate global trade contains provisions on export control measures and trustworthy/reliable partners in the supply chain (Authorized Economic Operators). The Secretariat promotes implementation of these standards among its members to improve supply chain security and transparency.

- In a joint effort of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and WCO, a training programme to implement the Financial Action Task Force recommendation on cross-border movements of cash was developed. Training seminars for Customs/border control officers to improve their capacity to detect illicit cash movements supporting money-laundering/terrorist and proliferation financing have been and will continue to be conducted.

- The WCO Secretariat has supported workshops and conferences organized by United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and other entities on improving the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). Conversely, experts have addressed WCO meetings on the provisions of the resolution and the important role of Customs in implementing and enforcing its legally binding provisions.

- Of the most traded chemicals controlled by the Chemical Weapons Convention 33 will receive specific Harmonized System codes to allow monitoring cross-border trade in these substances. Their specific Harmonized System codes will be integrated in the next version of the Harmonized System. This measure will also significantly improve Customs' risk profiling.

- The WCO Secretariat implements programme "Global Shield", which targets suspicious cross-border movements of precursor chemicals that can be used to produce Improvised Explosive Devices. The programme is supported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and INTERPOL.

WCO remains committed to support the work of the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and to support its member customs administrations in their work to implement the provisions contained therein.